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Dedication 
To the U.S. dairy producers 
I 
Abstract 
The Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers, created under the Agricultural Act of 
2014, is a new margin insurance program that pays indemnity when a national income-
over-feed-cost margin declines below an elected coverage level. A widely speculated side 
effect of the program is its potential to reduce uses of CME dairy futures and options for 
hedging purposes. The first essay studies this issue under the assumption that dairy 
producers adopt private hedging practices and the Margin Protection Program as ways to 
protect against catastrophic margin risks rather than for speculative profits. Empirical 
framework is set under the safety-first assumption in that a producer minimizes hedge ratio 
subject to a probabilistic constraint that restricts the revenue above a critical threshold. The 
novelty of this study is the use of accounting data on dairy cost of production in two U.S. 
regions. Monte Carlo simulation results that compare the crowding-out effect on 
representative producers in the upper and lower Midwest show the magnitude of the effect 
depends on production efficiency, market risk exposure, and the timing of the Margin 
Protection Program sign-up. 
The second essay proposes MPP-DL as a supplemental insurance program for the 2014 
Farm Bill dairy title margin program MPP-D (formally known as the Margin Protection 
Program for Dairy Producers). MPP-DL caps an indemnity payment to $1 per 
hundredweight of milk under protection. A model built on cumulative prospect theory is 
used to predict 37 representative farms’ sign-up choices. Risk attitude parameters are 
estimated by grid search method based on sign-up data for coverage year 2015. Fiscal cost 
analysis shows that MPP-DL is able to smooth payment streams over the years studied in 
this essay. Notably, MPP-DL can redirect producers to choose MPP-DL instead of MPP-
D when margin forecast at sign-up is above the historical average margin while also 
keeping the overall cost of the program lower than MPP-D. 
II 
The third essay investigates asymmetric transmission between farm-gate raw milk prices 
and retail fluid milk prices in 15 U.S. regional markets. A two-threshold three-regime error 
correction model is first estimated on individual price pairs. Threshold effect is then studied 
through Common Correlation Effect Mean Group panel data time series model for each 
regional market. A rich set of econometric tools are employed in empirical analysis to deal 
with discontinuous long-term price relationships. Structural break unit root tests and 
cointegration tests are performed to ensure the long-term relationship of retail-farm prices 
exists. Symmetry test results suggest that the majority of the regions feature positive 
asymmetric price transmission. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that asymmetry is 
sensitive to the presence of temporary retail sales price. 
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1 Will the Margin Protection Program for Dairy 
Producers Crowd Out Dairy Futures and Options? 
1.1 Introduction 
In the decade prior to 2015, due to the volatile milk price and increasing feed costs, the 
U.S. dairy industry had been facing an ever growing challenge to stay at a healthy profit 
margin. The once effective Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP), formerly 
known as the Dairy Price Support Program, became irrelevant in this new market landscape 
with its lower-than-market $9.90 per hundredweight (cwt) price floor for milk1 (see Figure 
1 below). Amid concerns over stabilizing income-over-feed-cost (IOFC) margin for dairy 
producers, the Agriculture Act of 2014, which will be referred to as the 2014 Farm Bill in 
the rest of the paper, authorized USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA) to administer an 
insurance program that pays indemnity if a national level of IOFC margin falls below a 
user-selected coverage level. Formally known as the Margin Protection Program for Dairy 
Producers (MPP), the insurance program has the potential to become a new risk 
management tool for the dairy industry.  
                                                 
1 The DPPSP supports the milk price by purchasing a basket of dairy products whenever a product’s price 
falls below a threshold that reflects the $9.90 milk price based on production relationship between the milk 
price and the product price. The program was discontinued in 2014 when the MMP was established.  
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Figure 1 Historical milk price vs. support price 
Throughout the passage of the 2014 Farm Bill, there has been considerable amount of 
speculation on the impact of the new margin protection program on the existing risk 
management practice through futures contracts traded on Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME) (Stephenson, et al., 2014, Wolf, et al., 2013). One of the reasons MPP may reduce 
CME contract uses is rooted in the fact that MPP premiums are subsidized by the federal 
government while CME contracts are sold at market fair prices. The lowest protection level 
of MPP is free for producers of all sizes. Actuarial pricing principle suggests that an 
insurance is valued at zero when the probability of indemnity being paid is also zero. Given 
a fixed level of protection, there is no guarantee that market conditions would always be 
conducive to not trigger indemnity payments. This means certain levels of MPP protection 
are cheaper than what the market would have charged for. 
A recent survey among dairy producers and market experts states that 10% to 50% of the 
trading volume on CME Class III milk contracts were placed by producers directly or 
through their cooperatives (Stephenson, et al., 2014). The upward sloping open interest 
curve presented in Figure 2 suggests that the interest in using Class III contracts for risk 
management purpose has been growing since the commodity was first introduced in 1996. 
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Part of the reason that contributes to the growing interest is that CME is the go-to place for 
dairy exporters to offset their risk associated with the commitments specified in forward 
contracts they signed with foreign importers. For example, a long position in Class III milk 
contracts effectively reduces a dairy exporter’s risk exposure to matters typically highly 
sensitive in the buyer’s home country. Without CME futures contracts, dairy exporters will 
find themselves unable to promise a fixed export price for long period of time2, therefore 
losing their comparative advantage to competitors in EU and New Zealand. 
 
Figure 2 Class III futures and options open interest 
The market concern about the MPP negatively affecting private risk management practice 
is founded in a historical precedent roughly five decades ago. The butter futures contract 
was first traded in the namesake Chicago Butter and Egg Board – the former entity of CME 
before 1919 – since the inception of the board. On October 1st, 1949, the DPPSP was 
established under the Agricultural Act of 1949. The DPPSP greatly reduced the price risk 
faced in dairy production and effectively sidelined butter contracts as a risk management 
                                                 
2 The earliest a person can trade a Class III milk futures contract is about 24 months ahead of the named 
expiration month of the contract. If an exporter uses such futures to hedge sales prices, they can secure the 
sales prices up to 24 months ahead of the delivery of their milk.  
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4 
tool for decades. The interest in butter contracts waned and the contract was ultimately 
delisted. 
Compared to the MPP that is designed at a national level, CME futures and options 
contracts as risk management tools provide great flexibility. Individual producers can 
customize their hedging strategies using one or several contracts to fit their specific 
production and risk profile. Therefore, it is of vital importance to maintain trading volumes 
of CME contracts. However, because the MPP provides an alternative to the traditional 
risk management tools through CME and only allows dairy producers to participate, many 
dairy risk management experts believe that the MPP may reduce the use of futures for risk 
management purpose if producers find it provides satisfactory risk protection (Stephenson, 
et al., 2014). In the rest of the paper, I refer to this reduction as the “crowding-out” effect. 
This paper seeks to answer this question: what is the magnitude of the crowding-out effect, 
if any, that the MPP poses to the dairy futures market? 
Newton, et al (2013a) argue that the margin protection program is not designed to be 
actuarially fair. An insurance program that is not actuarially fair is prone to the plague of 
adverse selection and moral hazard. This argument supports the heated speculation on the 
crowding-out effect. To take one step further on the issue, Wolf, et al. (2013) theoretically 
analyzed the change in hedge ratio with and without MPP under a mean-variance utility 
framework. Their findings confirm the existence of the crowding-out effect.  
This paper adds empirical analysis to previous studies. The results of this paper support the 
theoretical findings in Wolf, et al. (2013). But the model in this paper is built on a set of 
less restricted assumptions. The empirical study of this paper is also in line with the 9-
month mean-reversion theory in Bozic, et al. (2012) and suggests that MPP may better 
serve its purpose if the program sign-up period is further removed from the start of the 
coverage year. A novel dairy financial benchmark dataset utilized in this study allows us 
to look at the crowding-out effect by different regions, which is something that has not 
been done in previous studies.  
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The rest of the paper can be divided into several sections. The first section introduces the 
margin protection program and paves the way for the derivation of the empirical model in 
the second section. The third section details empirical methods and documents additional 
assumptions regarding the characterization of the multivariate log-normal distribution. 
Empirical results follow in the section after. The paper concludes in the last section by 
reiterating key findings and discussing directions for further research. 
1.2 Background: Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers 
The Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers (MPP) in the 2014 Farm Bill allows 
dairy producers to protect their income-over-feed-cost (IOFC) margin against adverse 
market conditions. Much like a put option on the IOFC margin, the MPP is a voluntary 
program that pays an indemnity if a national level bi-monthly IOFC margin falls below a 
coverage level that a dairy producer elects to purchase. The coverage period always starts 
in January and ends in December of the same year. Coverage year 2015 is the first coverage 
year under the current authorization of the farm bill and opened its sign-up period on Sept 
2nd, 2014. Subsequent coverage years (2016 - 2018) will start enrollment between July and 
September of the preceding year. There are four major components of the MPP: Actual 
Dairy Production Margin (ADPM), Production History (PH), Coverage Percentage (CP) 
and Coverage Level (CL). 
The Actual Dairy Production Margin (ADPM) is a type of IOFC margin that equals the 
average milk price for all grades of milk minus the cost of three key components of feed. 
The 2014 Farm Bill states that the ADPM is calculated from the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀 ($ cwt⁄ ) = 𝐴𝑙𝑙-𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ cwt⁄ ) 
−1.0728 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ bu⁄ ) 
−0.00735 × 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ ton⁄ ) 
−0.0137 × 𝐴𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑎 𝐻𝑎𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($/ton) 
(1) 
 
where All Milk Price is the national average wholesale milk price; Corn Price and Alfalfa 
Hay Price are national average prices reported by National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS); and Soybean Meal Price is the Dectaur-Central Illinois high protein soybean meal 
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price reported by Agricultural Marketing Service. Though 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀 can be calculated from 
monthly USDA data, the determination of the indemnity payment event is based on the 
two-month average ADPM. The two-month periods over which indemnity payment is 
determined start at the first two-month period of Jan/Feb and end at Nov/Dec with six in 
total in a coverage year. The formula implies that the ADPM is a national level IOFC 
margin and individual participants cannot tailor the ADPM to reflect their actual margin 
structure.  
The Production History (PH) determines the upper bound of the amount of milk production 
(in pounds) that one can cover in the MPP. The PH level for coverage year 2015 equals the 
highest annual production of a participating producer in the calendar years of 2011, 2012 
and 2013. PH in subsequent years are increased by a fixed percentage FSA announces in 
the summer of each year. The percentage increase applies to the coverage year after the 
year the percentage is announced. There are other rules in place to determine PH for new 
dairy producers whose production history has not been 3 years old. In this paper, PH is 
assumed known and the determination of its value is irrelevant to the research question.  
Coverage percentage (CP) is the percentage of PH that is covered in the MPP. Individual 
participants can elect to cover as low as 25% to as high as 90% of their PH with an 
increment of 5% in between. Coverage Level (CL) is the IOFC margin level that may 
trigger the indemnity payment if the ADPM slips below CL. It is between $4.00/cwt and 
$8.00/cwt in an interval of 50 cents.  
Annual premium of the MPP insurance depends on the CL and PH. The premium is priced 
to encourage small scale producers to participate by charging them less than larger dairy 
farms even though both may face the same risk environment. In order to entice high 
participation rate, the program offers a 25%-off discount to Tier 1 rates for all levels of CL 
except the $8.00/cwt coverage for coverage year 2015 and 2016. Detailed premium charges 
can be seen in Table 1.  
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Table 1 MPP Premiums under different coverage level and production history 
Coverage Level 
($/cwt) 
Tier 1 for 2015-2016 
($/cwt) 
Tier 1 for 2016-2018 
($/cwt) 
Tier 2 
($/cwt) 
$4.00 $0.000 $0.000 $0.000 
$4.50 $0.008 $0.010 $0.020 
$5.00 $0.019 $0.025 $0.040 
$5.50 $0.030 $0.040 $0.100 
$6.00 $0.041 $0.055 $0.155 
$6.50 $0.068 $0.090 $0.290 
$7.00 $0.163 $0.217 $0.830 
$7.50 $0.225 $0.300 $1.060 
$8.00 $0.356 $0.475 $1.360 
 
The tier 1 rates (2nd – 3rd columns in Table 1) apply to the first four million pounds of the 
covered production. The covered production is calculated as the product of production 
history and coverage percentage. The tier 2 rates apply to the rest of the covered production. 
For example, if a producer chooses to cover 50% (CP = 50%) of its 10 million pounds PH, 
the covered production equals 5 million pounds. The producer will pay the tier 1 rate for 
the first 4 million pounds of milk and the tier 2 rate for the remaining 1 million pounds. 
The premium calculation on a per hundredweight basis can be summarized in equation (2): 
 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = min (
4 million
𝐶𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝐻
, 1) ∙ 𝑅1 + max (1 −
4 million
𝐶𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝐻
, 0) ∙ 𝑅2 (2) 
 
where 𝑅1 is the tier 1 rate and 𝑅2 is the tier 2 rate. Both rates are functions of the coverage 
level.  
Because MPP requires a single sign-up to cover a whole calendar year, it is of dairy 
producer’s interest to select a proper coverage level for the entire coverage period. If a 
dairy producer believes the profit margin will be high during the coverage period, they may 
choose the lowest coverage level to minimize premium payment. If the dairy producer 
envisions the profit margin to be low, they may opt to purchase a higher coverage level to 
maximize the expected net indemnity payment (indemnity minus premium).  
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1.3 Model Framework: Hedging alongside the MPP 
Telser (1955) proposed a “safety-first” hedging model in which the primary goal of a risk-
averse producer is to keep below a chosen probability level the risk of his or her net income 
falling below a certain threshold. From there a long list of studies examined a variety of 
problems under mean-variance framework, such as Pyle and Turnovsky (1970), Ederington 
(1979), Anderson and Danthine (1980), and Anderson and Danthine (1981). Because the 
mean-variance framework considers upside risk and downside risk equally (Levy, 1974, 
Quirk and Saposnik, 1962, Tsiang, 1972), a second generation of risk analysis articles 
focused on the lower partial moments to measure hedging effectiveness. Examples of 
previous work on this topic include Berck and Hihn (1982), Turvey and Nayak (2009), 
Mattos, et al. (2008), Power and Vedenov (2010).  
Because hedging with futures curbs the overall profit when the market moves in favor of 
the cash market where the actual sales take place, it is not always a very profitable move 
to fully hedge one’s production. Therefore, it is safe to assume that as long as a producer’s 
action expose themselves under their tolerated risk level, they are willing to make a tradeoff 
between a locked-in profit margin with less upside potential and the opportunity to profit 
from favorable market environment. Therefore, a dairy producer’s risk behavior can be 
thought as to seek the lowest amount of risk protection in futures markets as long as the 
producer is comfortable with the risk they take. This assumption holds with or without 
MPP participation because MPP only pays indemnity in an adverse market environment. 
MPP alleviates the loss dairy producers may suffer when milk price is low or feed cost is 
high.  
Other assumptions I make for the empirical model: 
1. No production risk: the expected production turns out to be the actual production. 
2. There are only two types of producers: feed growers and feed purchasers. Feed 
growers grow feed on site to meet ration needs completely. Feed purchasers buy all 
feed from open markets.  
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3. Futures contract size is perfectly divisible: one can always find an integer number 
of futures contracts to cover their production no matter the hedge ratio or production 
level.  
4. Producers set up the hedge portfolio for the entire production in an MPP coverage 
year at the time they sign up for the program. There are twelve hedging portfolios 
targeting 12 months of the coverage year. All contracts are held until contract 
expiry. Hedge for feed is at a fixed proportion to the milk output according to feed 
ration.  
5. A producer’s creditworthiness does not depend on MPP participation. This 
assumption ensures the minimum short-term financial obligation a producer must 
meet to operate their business is independent of MPP participation.  
A dairy producer who seeks to find the least hedge coverage while having the risk in check 
solves the following problem 
 
min ℎ
𝑠. 𝑡.      Pr [𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 ≤ 𝑅𝑇𝐿] ≤ 𝛾
ℎ ∈ [0,1]
 (3) 
 
where ℎ, the hedge ratio, is defined as the proportion of the milk production being hedged 
over the overall production; Pr[∙] denotes the probability of a catastrophic event; 𝑅𝑇𝐿 
denotes a revenue threshold level and is typically set around the variable cost of production; 
𝛾 represents the maximum risk the producer can tolerate in terms of the probability of the 
revenue being below the 𝑅𝑇𝐿. The inequality constraint in the problem is termed the risk 
constraint. Everything in the problem is deterministic except the 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 term. The term 
is subject to milk and feed price shocks. The hedge ratio is bound between 0 and 1 to 
eliminate over-hedging. Given that the hedge ratio is being minimized here, if the 
optimized hedge ratio still turns out to be greater than 1, either the risk tolerance level (𝛾) 
is unrealistically strict against the risk environment or the cost of production is too high 
resulting in a very large 𝑅𝑇𝐿.  
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The 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 term in the risk constraint is further specified by the following formula: 
𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝛼 (
1
6
 ∑ 𝐼𝑗 − 𝑃
𝑀𝑃𝑃
6
𝑗=1
) + (∑ 𝛽𝑇 ∙ 𝑀𝐼(𝑇)
12
𝑇
) + ℎ (∑ 𝛽𝑇 ∙ 𝐻𝐺(𝑇)
12
𝑇
) (4) 
 
This formula defines the monthly average revenue on a per hundredweight basis. The three 
terms separated by the plus signs respectively represent the MPP net indemnity payment, 
income from milk sales and the hedging Profit & Loss (P&L). In the formula, 𝑡 denotes 
the date when the producer registers for the program. 𝑇 represents an MPP coverage month 
with value 1 denoting January, value 2 denoting February and so on. 𝛽𝑇  adjusts for 
production seasonality for month T. It is equal to the ratio of average monthly production 
in month T over the average annual production in the period between 2008 and 2014. The 
actual values of 𝛽𝑇  can be found in Table 13. 𝐻𝐺(𝑇) defines the per hundred weight 
hedging P&L for month 𝑇’s milk production. Similarly 𝑀𝐼(𝑇) denotes the per hundred 
weight income from milk sales in month 𝑇 . Furthermore, 𝑗  represents a bi-monthly 
indemnity payment period in a coverage year. It starts with the Jan-Feb period and ends 
with the Nov-Dec period. 𝐼𝑗 denotes the MPP indemnity payment made for the 𝑗th period. 
𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑃 denotes the MPP premium calculated from equation (2). Since MPP is not actuarially 
fair, the first term in equation (4), which represents the expected indemnity payment, does 
not vanish to zero under normal conditions. Finally, 𝛼 represents the coverage ratio whose 
sole purpose is to sale the net indemnity payment to match with the expected production 
level. For an MPP non-participant, 𝛼 is set to zero, whereas for a participant, it is defined 
as 
 𝛼 =
𝐶𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝐻
𝑌
 (5) 
 
where 𝐶𝑃 ∙ 𝑃𝐻 calculates the covered production level and 𝑌 denotes the expected annual 
production.  
The income from the milk sales is defined as 
 𝑀𝐼(𝑇) = 𝑃𝑇
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 − 𝜉(𝜔𝐶𝑃𝑇
𝐶 + 𝜔𝑆𝑀𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑀 + 𝜔𝐻𝑃𝑇
𝐻) (6) 
11 
 
where 𝑃𝑇
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘, 𝑃𝑇
𝐶 , 𝑃𝑇
𝑆𝑀 and 𝑃𝑇
𝐻 are the monthly average mailbox milk price, spot corn price, 
spot soybean meal price and alfalfa hay price respectively. The subscript 𝑇 denotes the 
month over which these prices are averaged. 𝜔𝐶 , 𝜔𝑆𝑀 , 𝜔𝐻  collectively denote the feed 
ration (of corn, soybean meal and hay) for producing one hundredweight of milk. 𝜉 is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 for feed purchasers and 0 for feed growers.  
Under the minimization setup of problem (3), one can expect the minimum milk sales 
income that satisfies the risk constraint is lower under MPP participation due to the added 
indemnity revenue in equation (4) under MPP participation (𝛼 ≠ 0). This is partially 
achieved by making 𝑅𝑇𝐿  fixed regardless of MPP participation. 𝑅𝑇𝐿  in the model 
represents the lowest amount of revenue at which a producer is able to conduct their 
business. It is a producer-specific number that reflects the cost of production and line of 
credit. None of the two factors affecting 𝑅𝑇𝐿 depend on MPP participation. For example, 
if a producer with no access to line of credit has to spend 80 cents in feed and other expenses 
to produce a hundred pounds of milk, production would have to stop if the producer is 
unable to pay that amount. In this case, 𝑅𝑇𝐿 equals 80 cents and is independent of MPP 
participation.  
Since feed growing cost is not included in the definition of 𝑀𝐼(𝑇), it is added back to the 
right-hand side of the catastrophic event inequality. In other words, 𝑅𝑇𝐿 for feed growers 
is set to be the feed growing cost plus other operating expenses. As for feed purchasers, 
since 𝑀𝐼(𝑇) takes into account the feed purchasing cost, 𝑅𝑇𝐿 equals the operating cost net 
feed purchasing cost. 
The hedging P&L is specified as the following: 
 
𝐻𝐺(𝑇) = 𝑤 Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐷𝐸 + (1 − 𝑤)Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐷𝐾
−  𝜉[(𝜔𝐶 + 𝜔𝐻𝐵𝐻,𝐶)Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐶 + (𝜔𝑆𝑀 + 𝜔𝐻𝐵𝐻,𝑆𝑀)Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝑆𝑀] 
(7) 
 
In the above equation, Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐷𝐸 and Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐷𝐾 respectively denote the hedging P&L from a short 
Class III milk position of one contract and the P&L from a short Class IV milk position of 
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the same size. The position is set up at time 𝑡 and targets the production in coverage month 
𝑇. Similarly, Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝐶  and Δ𝐹𝑡,𝑇
𝑆𝑀 denote the hedging P&L from a short Corn position and a 
short soybean meal position respectively. The position size of each grain hedge equals the 
size of one contract. These positions are then resized by the terms they are multiplied with. 
The milk sales is cross-hedged with Class III and Class IV contracts. The size of the milk 
hedge is split between these two futures by the weight 𝑤. Hay is cross hedged with corn 
and soybean meal contracts. 𝐵𝐻,𝐶 and 𝐵𝐻,𝑆𝑀 are coefficients for corn and soybean meal 
futures in the cross hedge. They are multiplied by the feed ration coefficient for hay 𝜔𝐻 to 
align with the milk production level.  
The indemnity payment is modeled as a simple put option. The strike price of a put option 
is analogous to the MPP coverage level (𝐶𝐿) and the price of the underlying asset is 
analogous to the ADPM. 
 𝐼𝑗 = max(𝐶𝐿 − 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑗  ,0) (8) 
 
where 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑗  is obtained by using equation (1) with monthly prices and averaging the 
obtained ADPM’s over the two months in the 𝑗th bi-monthly period.  
As discussed in the previous section, a producer may optimally choose a coverage level to 
maximize the expected net indemnity received from the MPP. This behavior can be 
modeled as the following optimization problem: 
 𝐶𝐿∗ = arg max
𝐶𝐿
1
6
 ∑ 𝐸𝑡[𝐼𝑗(𝐶𝐿)] − 𝑃
𝑀𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐿)
6
𝑗=1
 (9) 
 
where 𝐼𝑗  and 𝑃
𝑀𝑃𝑃  are now functions of 𝐶𝐿 ; and 𝐸𝑡[∙]  denotes the expected value 
conditioned at time 𝑡 that reflects a producer’s belief of the market.  
It is worth noting that if we view 𝑅𝑇𝐿  and 𝛾  in the problem (3) deterministic, the 
probability of the catastrophic event is the cumulative distribution function of the random 
variable 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒. As a cumulative distribution function, the probability is monotonically 
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increasing in the threshold 𝑅𝑇𝐿. This means the probability of a catastrophic event is higher 
when the cost of production is higher. The relation between the catastrophic probability 
and the hedge ratio depends on whether or not the hedge is “good”. A hedge is termed 
“good” if it makes the catastrophic probability monotonically decreasing in hedge ratio. A 
“good” hedge makes the hedge-locked-in revenue greater than the revenue threshold. To 
see that, imagine a world of one commodity and no basis risk. Let’s further simplify it to 
have only three possible states of the market: conducive, neutral, and adverse to cash sales 
with equal probability. Consider the following example in Table 2. 
Table 2 Three-state hedge monotonicity example 
 ℎ = 0.9 ℎ = 0.5 ℎ = 0.1 
Market Hedge P&L Cash Sales Revenue Income 
Conducive -$1 $4 $3.1 $3.5 $3.9 
Neutral $0 $3 $3.0 $3.0 $3.0 
Adverse $1 $2 $2.9 $2.5 $2.1 
Cost Hedge Outcome Catastrophic Probability 
𝑅𝑇𝐿 = 3.6 Bad hedge 100% 100% 66.7% 
𝑅𝑇𝐿 = 3.2 Bad hedge 100% 66.7% 66.7% 
𝑅𝑇𝐿 = 2.8 Good hedge 0% 33.3% 33.3% 
𝑅𝑇𝐿 = 2.4 Good hedge 0% 0% 33.3% 
 
The average hedge-locked-in sales income is $3.0 in the above example. As one can see 
from the table, when the cost of production (𝑅𝑇𝐿) is above the locked-in level, catastrophic 
probability decreases as the hedge ratio decreases. The opposite is true when the cost of 
production is below the locked-in level. Problem (3) is not defined in case of a “bad” hedge 
where more hedged production incurs higher probability of a catastrophic event. “Bad” 
hedge is not of particular interest of this study because they are not desired form of 
conventional risk management.  
1.4 Empirical Strategy 
The empirical study follows closely a method used in Newton, et al. (2013a), Newton, et 
al. (2013b), and Bozic, et al. (2014). Their method derives market outlooks from futures 
and options markets, and simulates different price scenarios in line with the outlooks. The 
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derivative markets used to derive price scenarios include the CME corn, soybean meal, 
Class III milk and Class IV milk markets. Once price scenarios are simulated, the optimal 
hedge ratios are calculated for an MPP participant (𝜉 = 1) and a non-participant (𝜉 = 0). 
Comparison of the difference in hedge ratios is then carried out to measure the degree of 
crowding-out.  
Data sources include “Understanding Dairy Markets” website 3 for mailbox milk price and 
futures and options close prices, and USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service for 
other USDA prices. I also use regional aggregate accounting data from Genske Mulder & 
Co, LLP to study the crowding-out effect by regions. These regions are upper Midwest 
(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and 
Michigan) and lower Midwest (Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Utah).  
There are two major parts that compose the method. The first part consists of several basis 
models that convert CME corn and soybean meal futures prices, announced USDA Class 
III and Class IV prices to the NASS corn, soybean meal, hay prices and all-milk price used 
in equation (1) and the milk spot price 𝑃𝑇
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 as in equation (5). The second part derives a 
joint distribution of the futures prices of the four commodities. 
1.4.1 Estimating Actual Dairy Production Margin and Spot Price 
Because all USDA prices are only observed once in real life for a given month, 
counterfactual scenarios are derived from distributional assumptions made for CME 
futures contract. This section explains how these USDA prices are approximated by the 
simulated CME futures prices. Regression models are estimated to convert CME prices to 
USDA prices at national and local levels. National level prices comprise the right-hand-
side of equation (1) and determine the 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀 level for indemnity calculation. The local 
level prices are used to derive the hedge (𝐻𝐺(𝑇)) and sales (𝑀𝐼(𝑇)) part of equation(4). 
Data from Jan, 2000 to Feb, 2014 are collected for these models. These include NASS 
revised prices that appear in equation (1) and settlement prices on the last traded day of 
Class III, IV, corn and soybean meal futures. Because Class III and IV futures cease to 
                                                 
3 Web address: http://future.aae.wisc.edu/ 
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trade on the day USDA announces Class III and IV prices, the settlement prices on the last 
trading day of those two contracts are the announced USDA prices. Prices for upper and 
lower Midwest model are spatial averages of each region’s component states. The period 
for each series is from Jan 2001 to Jan 2014. Model estimates can be found in Table 15 and 
Table 16 in Appendix B. 
The NASS all-milk price in equation (1) is the national average milk price dairy producers 
receive. Here I use the classified milk prices under federal milk marketing order to model 
the all-milk price. The Class I and Class II prices can be approximated by the Class III and 
Class IV prices in the same period and the higher of the lagged Class III or Class IV prices. 
This is because (a) the Class I and Class II prices are derived from the same component 
value formula used to derive Class III and Class IV prices and (b) the lagged term can 
account for the advanced pricing in Class I and Class II. The last point is supported by a 
regression of Base Class I price on max(Class IIIt-1, Class IVt-1) without a constant term. 
The regression R-squared is at 99%. Figure 3 below illustrates the predictive power of the 
lag-max term on base Class I.  
 
Figure 3 Base Class I price and the higher of lagged Class III and Class IV price 
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NASS corn price and soybean meal price are approximated by the CME corn futures and 
soybean meal futures prices respectively. However, there are only 5 corn contracts and 8 
soybean meal contracts in a calendar year. This means not every NASS price in a calendar 
month has its suited futures contract. A data stacking rule employed by Newton, et al. 
(2013a), Newton, et al. (2013b), and Risk Management Agency (2005) is adapted to deal 
with this issue. For those NASS prices that don’t have a futures contract that expires in the 
same month, the weighted average terminal price of the two contracts that expire right 
before and after the NASS price is paired with the NASS price for regression. Table 3 
shows how corn and soybean meal futures prices are paired with NASS prices. A month in 
the first column represents a calendar month in which a USDA price is averaged over. A 
month in the second or third column represents a futures contract expiration month. 
Table 3 Weights on grain futures to pair with USDA price 
USDA Price Month Corn Contracts Soybean Meal Contracts 
Jan ⅔ Dec + ⅓ Mar  Jan 
Feb ⅓ Dec + ⅔ Mar  ½ Jan + ½ Mar 
Mar Mar  Mar 
Apr ½ Mar + ½ May  ½ Mar + ½ May  
May May  May  
Jun ½ May + ½ Jul  ½ May + ½ Jul  
Jul Jul  Jul  
Aug ½ Jul + ½ Sep  Aug  
Sep Sep  Sep  
Oct ⅔ Sep + ⅓ Dec  Oct  
Nov ⅓ Sep + ⅔ Dec  ½ Oct + ½ Dec  
Dec Dec Dec 
 
Although NASS hay price does not have a CME counterpart, a regression model of hay 
price on corn, soybean meal and lagged hay price is developed to convert simulated CME 
prices to the hay price ((Newton, et al., 2013a, Newton, et al., 2013b). This specification is 
justified for at least two reasons: (a) Competition for land to grow corn, soybean or hay 
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makes corn and soybean meal prices correlated with hay prices; and (b) Some persistent 
unexplained factors can be dealt with by the lagged term to correct for autocorrelation. 
Milk is cross-hedged with Class III and Class IV futures contracts. OLS estimates are 
obtained for the regression model of local mailbox milk price on the terminal prices of the 
two futures (see Table 14). The justification of model specification is the same for the 
aforementioned all-milk price models. The sum of the coefficient on the futures is very 
close to 14 for both regions. Due to this finding, the hedged milk is split into two portions. 
The first one is covered by Class III futures while the second by Class IV futures. Because 
the sum of the coefficients is close to 1, a restricted regression of the same specification 
but with the constraint of the sum being 1 is estimated. This gives an estimate of 𝑤=0.6863 
for upper Midwest and 𝑤=0.3136 for lower Midwest. 𝐵𝐻,𝐶 and 𝐵𝐻,𝑆𝑀 in equation (6) are 
estimated in the similar fashion but without a constraint (see cross-hedge models in Table 
17). In light of the above analysis, absolute value of the constant coefficients in equation 
(1) are used as the estimates for the ration weights 𝜔𝐶, 𝜔𝑆𝑀 and 𝜔𝐻 in equation (5) and 
(6). 
1.4.2 The Joint Distribution of CME futures 
Futures prices are assumed to follow log-normal distributions. Their joint distribution is 
modeled by a multivariate Gaussian copula. These two distributional assumptions are part 
of the official rating method of Live Stock Margin insurance program. They are also widely 
used by other studies in the dairy risk management field (see Newton, et al. 2013a, Newton, 
et al. 2013b, Bozic, et al. 2014). Because a multivariate Gaussian distribution is equivalent 
to a multivariate Gaussian copula with Gaussian marginal distributions, logarithmic futures 
prices can be viewed as jointly following a multivariate Gaussian distribution. A 
Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient between two price shocks is used to populate the 
variance-covariance matrix parameter for the multivariate Gaussian. A price shock 𝜂𝜏
𝑇 is 
the difference between a futures’ terminal price at time 𝑇 and its price quoted 𝜏 time units 
                                                 
4 The sum of the OLS coefficients on milk futures is 0.0058 above 1 for upper Midwest model and 0.0126 
above 1 for lower Midwest model. See Table 14 for detail.  
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before 𝑇 . Assume the time series {𝜂𝜏
𝑇𝑖} with element shocks of a same commodity is 
autocovariance-ergodic as 𝑖 → ∞. In other words, autocovariance made from shocks taken 
over a period of 𝜏  time units regardless of contract expiration is treated as the 
autocovariance of a latent shock variable 𝜂𝜏 . Given the shock is 𝜏 time units ahead of 
contract expiration regardless what contract it is, the ergodicity assumption implies that the 
new information made available in the period of 𝜏 time units before contract expiration has 
the same effect on determining the price movement leading to the terminal price. In other 
words, it is assumed here that the effect of information uncertainty is a function of the 
length of the time period leading to the terminal price. Information uncertainty has little to 
do with when the contract expires. To estimate the correlation coefficient matrix, a 
sequence of 𝜏’s in an increment of one month is set up to calculate the Spearman’s rho 
coefficient between {𝜂𝜏𝑗
𝑇𝑖} and {𝜂𝜏𝑘
𝑇𝑖 } for the (𝑗,𝑘) element of the matrix. Table 3 is used to 
compute the weighted futures price to make sure each 𝜏 has a grain shock to match with. 
The correlation matrix measures intra- and inter-commodity co-movements up to 24 
months before contract expiration. Appendix A explains in detail about the simulation 
process. Its general steps are described as the following: 
Step 1: Gather settlement prices of Class III, Class IV, corn and soybean meal futures and 
the corresponding At-The-Money (ATM) put and call options on a particular trading day 
together with U.S. Treasury Bill rates that match the last trading day of each option. If no 
such rate matches, linear interpolation of the two rates that surround the option expiration 
date is used as the risk-free rate.  
Step 2: Calculate implied volatility for each futures. This is done by inverting trinomial 
tree option pricing model (Boyle, 1986) with ATM options prices, risk-free rate and option 
expiry in years as inputs. 
Step 3: Simulate each futures price from multivariate Gaussian distribution. The mean and 
standard deviation of a marginal distribution depend on the logarithm of the current futures 
price and the implied volatility calculated from Step 2. A Spearman’s rho correlation 
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matrix that meets the ergodicity assumption is used to model the dependence structure. For 
details, please see Appendix A. 
Step 4: Convert futures prices into USDA prices by models specified in Table 14 and Table 
15. 
The prices generated from step 3 and 4 are component prices used in the formulae 
mentioned in the previous section. 
1.5 Results: How big is the crowding-out effect? 
The optimal hedge ratio is first calculated as a function of production cost 𝑅𝑇𝐿 and MPP 
participation parameter 𝜉. A producer profile has to be determined before the function can 
be uniquely defined. Three representative farms are assumed with production history of 4 
million, 6 million and 60 million pounds. The 4-million-pound production history is the 
tier 1 premium threshold. Any operation with production history less than 4 million pounds 
is charged by the same rate. The 6-million-pound production history is around the national 
average production history in coverage year 2015 and 2016. The 60 million production 
history is an approximation of an extremely large producer whose effective premium rate 
is close to pure tier 2 rate. Overall, these three cases represent small, average and large 
producers in the nation. Their risk tolerance level 𝛾 is set to be 5%. The optimal hedge 
ratio function is empirically determined by a heuristic algorithm. The algorithm starts off 
by attempting a very low cost level, for example 0. If production is free or very low, there 
is no need to hedge at all. This assumption is reasonable when the output is a good rather 
than a bad. For the same reason, the catastrophic probability shall be zero when the cost of 
production is negligible. Keeping the hedge ratio at zero, the algorithm moves up the cost 
level 𝑅𝑇𝐿 until the catastrophic probability violates the risk constraint. As argued in the 
previous section, the catastrophic probability is monotonically decreasing in hedge ratio. 
Hence, increasing the hedge ratio may bring the catastrophic probability down to the risk 
tolerance level 𝛾. Any further attempts to lower catastrophic probability would result in a 
sub-optimal solution with a higher hedge ratio. In this case, the algorithm finds an interior 
solution and minimization of the hedge ratio can be simplified to a root finding problem 
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that makes the risk constraint binding. Empirically this is done by the bisection root finding 
method (Burden & Faires, 1985).  
Hedge ratio functions are determined for hypothetical coverage years 2008 to 2014 with 1 
million simulated scenarios in each case. For each coverage year, three different sign-up 
periods are considered: the April, October and January sign-up. The April and October 
sign-up are set on the closest business day to the first day of the month in the year before 
the coverage year. The January sign-up is assumed to be done on the closest business day 
to January 1st of the coverage year. Had the MPP existed in those years, the results show 
what the expected effect on the hedge ratio would have been given the market condition at 
sign-up. There are 240 combinations of optional hedge ratio functions with respect to 
representative farms and sign-up periods. Each can be represented by a graph where the x-
axis indicates the production cost and the y-axis shows the hedge ratio. A sample of those 
charts can be found from Figure 15 to Figure 685 in Appendix B. The downward sloping 
curve in black depicts the percentage change in the hedge ratios caused by MPP 
participation.  
Several quick observations can be made from those figures. First, regardless of MPP 
participation, the upward-sloping optimal hedge ratio curves suggest that producers need 
more hedge protection when their production cost is high. Second, in most cases with 
optimal coverage level at $4.00/cwt, the difference in hedge ratio between a participant and 
non-participant is almost zero. This is possibly because the baseline MPP coverage 
provides too little protection to influent hedging choices between the hedging portfolios. 
Third, the percentage drop in hedge ratios is larger at lower cost levels than that at higher 
ones. This suggests that highly efficient producers experience stronger crowding-out effect 
than their inefficient peers. As an interesting case to note, some figures for example, those 
for 2009 and 2012, suggest that extremely inefficient producers may need more hedging 
protection on top of MPP compared to the case with the same producer but in the absence 
                                                 
5 Only charts for coverage year 2009, 2012 and 2013 are provided. Charts for other coverage years are not 
presented in this paper because they add no additional insights to what the three years have already 
revealed.  
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of MPP. Fourth, many of the hedge ratio curves for MPP participants and some of those 
for non-participants do not reach 100%. This does not mean a full hedge is an infeasible 
solution. The problem lies in the computational limitation of the numerical analysis. If the 
number of simulation scenarios were increased to more than 1 million, one should be able 
to observe the curves getting closer to 100%.  
To study the actual crowding-out effect in different regions, production cost is derived from 
data provided by Genske Mulder & Co, LLP. Because of the model setup, the 𝑅𝑇𝐿 level 
for feed growers is taken as the sum of feed growing cost and other operating expense. The 
𝑅𝑇𝐿 level for feed purchasers is simply the other operating expense from Genske 
accounting data. The other operating expense accounts for costs not related to feed and 
herd replacement. It includes, for example, equipment leases, employee benefits, insurance 
premium, etc. These costs are reported in terms of dollar per total annual production. It is 
reported this way because dairy producers are more interested in protecting average profit 
margin of an entire year rather than that of a single month (Bozic, et al., 2012). Occasional 
shocks can be smoothed out by lines of credit or cash reserves.  
Table 4 reports the average percentage decline in hedge ratios in each region for each 
producer type. In general, Table 4 shows that the Upper Midwest region experiences 
stronger crowding out effect than the Lower Midwest region. One may also find from Table 
4 that feed purchasers face stronger crowding-out effect than feed growers across regions 
and producer sizes. This observation seems to reflect the fact that feed growers assume 
zero feed cost risk while feed purchasers face full exposure to the feed market. Since feed 
growers and feed purchasers sit on two ends of the feed risk spectrum, the reduction in 
hedge ratio with these two groups may suggest the boundaries of the crowding-out effect 
for producers with somewhat feed cost risk. Interestingly, the difference in crowding-out 
effect between the two groups diminishes as the gap between sign-up and the start of 
coverage is removed. This implies that the level of feed cost risk becomes less of a concern 
once everyone has a better grip on future market movements in the coverage year. When 
inspecting the hedge ratio reduction along the sign-up periods for each producer group, one 
may notice that feed growers experience increasing crowding-out effects whereas feed 
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purchasers see the opposite. This might be due to the fact that diminishing sign-up gap 
reduces feed cost uncertainty and leaves milk price risk as the main driver for hedge ratio 
reduction. Finally, larger producers experience weaker crowding-out effect than smaller 
producers. This observation might be the result of two forces: one being larger producers 
are generally more efficient due to economies of scale. Second, MPP is much more 
expensive for larger producers therefore their appetite for the program is much smaller on 
a per hundred weight basis than smaller producers. To fill the gap in their hedging needs, 
large producers are more inclined to use CME contracts.  
Table 4 Average percentage decline in hedge ratio 
 4 million PH April Sign-up Oct Sign-up Jan Sign-up 
Upper 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 20.35% 40.00% 
Feed Purchaser 87.52% 40.00% 25.00% 
Lower 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 23.20% 19.31% 
Feed Purchaser 72.01% 40.85% 25.00% 
     
 6 million PH April Sign-up Oct Sign-up Jan Sign-up 
Upper 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 21.08% 38.04% 
Feed Purchaser 66.37% 39.88% 25.00% 
Lower 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 23.69% 39.17% 
Feed Purchaser 40.26% 37.24% 25.00% 
     
 60 million PH April Sign-up Oct Sign-up Jan Sign-up 
Upper 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 14.85% 10.52% 
Feed Purchaser 49.83% 19.94% 10.26% 
Lower 
Midwest 
Feed Grower 0.00% 10.55% 20.82% 
Feed Purchaser 25.41% 15.17% 7.52% 
 
Detailed percentage drop in hedge ratios are reported from Table 20 to Table 31. An “N/A” 
in those tables indicates the cost of production is too high and the hedging strategy the 
model utilizes cannot keep the producer’s revenue above water. If producers were able to 
lock in at better futures prices, they might be able to cover a higher cost of production. The 
average percentage reduction reported in Table 4 excludes those cases with “N/A” values.  
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The dairy industry suffered a historical blow to the margin in 2009. As a special case study, 
it is worth looking at what the empirical results show for 2009. A quick inspection of the 
realized ADPM in Figure 4 reveals that the ADPM profit margin reached its bottom at the 
end of the second quarter in 2009. Coincidentally January sign-up happened at a time when 
the market was trapped in the middle of the drastic margin decline. Given the market 
situation at the time, it is hard to believe that any bullish signal could be picked up in the 
January, 2009 market. The possible bearish signal may have given rise to the highest 
indemnity payment ($2.30/cwt) and the lowest cash sales income across producer types 
and regions (see Table 19). One may question why the $8.00/cwt MPP coverage appeared 
ineffective in keeping the margin above the cost. Note that the model optimally picks the 
best coverage level for each sign-up period. Any other coverage level will bring less net 
indemnity payment to the overall revenue. This only leaves us to suspect a bad hedge is 
the issue. Indeed, with the market in the middle of the downward spiral, it would be too 
late for any hedge that were made at that time to lock in a promising margin. Does the 
hedge made three months earlier fare better than the January hedge? The absence of “N/A” 
values for October sign-up from Table 20 to Table 31 suggest that producers were able to 
cover their cost of production 3 months before coverage starts.  
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Figure 4 Realized ADPM from Jan, 2003 to Feb, 2015 
 
Figure 5 Forward ADPM 
Bozic, et al. (2012) show that there exists a 9-month mean reversion in IOFC margin in the 
dairy industry. Figure 5 above shows the forward ADPM up to 18 months before the 
ADPM is realized. A forward ADPM at 𝑛 months to maturity equals the ADPM calculated 
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from the futures prices quoted 𝑛 months before they mature. In Figure 5, futures prices are 
taken around the first day of a month. The dispersion in forward ADPM peaks at the 
realized level (at 0 month to maturity) and wanes its way out as it moves away from its 
named month. The dispersion becomes relatively stable at the 9-month mark. This fact 
suggests that any gap less than 9 months between the MPP sign-up and program kick-off 
cannot lock in a long-term average margin in the futures market. There is still plenty of 
room within those 9 months for the market consensus to evolve on what the coming 
calendar year would be like. If producers were to use market outlook embedded in futures 
market to speculatively choose MPP coverage level, they may find it difficult to do so once 
the sign-up/kick-off gap is 9 month long or more. Results seem to suggest this is the case. 
The standard deviation of the coverage level for the April sign-up is 1.36 while the standard 
deviation of the coverage level for the October sign-up is 1.24. From an insurance issuer’s 
standpoint, a diverse pool of coverage levels selected among producers is an indicator of 
less occurrence of the adverse gaming behavior.  
1.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
Empirical results suggest that MPP is likely to crowd out hedging uses of CME contracts. 
Between the two regions studied here, the Upper Midwest region experiences more 
pronounced crowding-out effect than the Lower Midwest region. Besides the geographic 
locations, this study also shows that the crowding-out effect depends on the production 
efficiency, feed market risk exposure, size of the producer, and the timing of the program 
sign-up. More efficient producers experience more pronounced crowding-out effect. 
Higher market risk exposure induces higher crowding-out effect. But the feed exposure 
matters less and less as the time of the year progresses closer to the start of the coverage 
period. Larger producers see less effect on their use of CME contracts from MPP 
participation. Feed growers experience little crowding-out effect when they enter the 
program early while feed purchasers endure less crowding-out effect when they sign up 
late. Although longer sign-up gap should in theory reduces speculative use of MPP, it may 
also introduce more crowding-out among certain producer groups. A strategic choice of 
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the gap is required to strike the balance between curbing adverse selection and keeping 
CME markets vibrant.  
Shortcomings of the model and method in this paper call for future studies in several areas. 
First, this paper assumes futures prices follow multivariate log-normal distribution. A 
refined distributional assumption can be made to deal with tail dependency issues. Second, 
the theoretical model assumes producers hedge on the day of the MPP sign-up. This 
assumption may not always meet producer’s risk protection need. A further study on 
hedging ahead of MPP sign-up period to cover variable cost is needed to fully address the 
issue of crowding-out effect. Third, it is important to understand how long a gap between 
MPP coverage period and sign-up deadline needs to be in order to thwart adverse gaming 
and to minimize the crowding-out of private dairy risk markets. Finally, MPP crowding-
out may be sensitive to changes in component prices of the ADPM formula. Sensitivity 
analysis on this topic can shed light on the adequacy of the national level ADPM formula.   
27 
2 Methods for Evaluating Fiscal Costs of Alternative 
Policy Designs of Margin Protection Program for Dairy 
Producers 
2.1 Introduction 
Margin Protection Program for Dairy Producers (MPP-D) is a federal dairy safety-net 
program promulgated in the Agricultural Act of 2014 (2014 Farm Bill). The program 
makes a payment when a national average Income-Over-Feed-Cost (IOFC) margin falls 
below a producer-selected level. Since its commencement, the program received wide 
acceptance among dairy producers. Based on National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) Milk Production reports and signup information made public on United States 
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency (FSA) website, 55% of dairy operations 
entered the program in 2014 to cover milk production in the next year. The number went 
up to 59% the year after. The program covered 69% of the national milk produced in 2015 
and 76% in 2016.  
MPP-D’s popularity however does not mask its shortcomings. Among several discussed in 
Newton et al. (2013) and Wolf, et al. (2013), MPP-D is not priced in an actuarially fair 
way. Though program premia were initially set to subsidize producers for entering the 
program, the feed cost portion of the formula that calculates the benchmark IOFC margin 
was marked down by 10% in Congress just before it was passed in the 2014 Farm Bill 
(NMPF, 2017)6. This last-minute mark-down artificially inflates benchmark dairy margin 
and consequently makes premia more expensive relative to the indemnities paid under new 
formula. Recent conducive market conditions further exacerbate the imbalance between 
the Farm Bill fixed MPP-D premia and the actuarially fair premia. Figure 6 presents the 
implied subsidy of each coverage level (on horizontal axis) for a producer with less than 4 
million pounds of average annual production. The implied subsidy is the percentage by 
                                                 
6 Congressional leaders at the time wanted to achieve a balanced budgetary target for the 2014 Farm Bill. If 
feed cost coefficients were not taken down by 10%, they would have had to find savings from other parts of 
the bill. However, two full coverage years of MPP-D suggested that the 10% cut may not generate enough 
benefits for dairy producers. 
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which actuarially fair premium differs from the official MPP-D premium. Because the 
catastrophic coverage at $4.0/cwt is free, all three years shown in the figure reports the 
highest subsidy level at that coverage. However, 2017 has seen premia for all other 
coverage levels higher than actuarially fair prices. It is not surprising that the number of 
producers opted in for free coverage level rises every year (see Figure 7).  
 
Figure 6 Implied subsidy as the percentage of actuarially fair premium 
 
Figure 7 Percent of milk covered under catastrophic coverage and other coverage levels 
(Source: Bozic (2017, p. 30)) 
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NMPF (2017) proposed to restore benchmark margin formula to the original coefficients 
and replace the use of NASS prices with Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) prices. 
Higher feed coefficients directly reduce benchmark margin so that indemnity payouts are 
more likely. NMPF argues that AMS prices represent actual farm feed costs better because 
too many non-dairy related price points are averaged into NASS prices. Applying 2015 
signup choices to hypothetical coverage years prior to 2015, one can calculate the policy 
costs shown in Table 5 and analyze fiscal implications in a static way. When looking at 
NMPF’s two suggestions separately, based on 2015-2016 signup information, one may 
find that the first suggestion would increase the average annual net payout from 2000 to 
2016 by 185% while the second increases the payout by 52%. The increase based on full 
NMPF solution skyrockets to 276%.  
To smooth indemnity payments across years, policy makers are also seeking more payouts 
in years when margins are below historical average but still not catastrophically low. The 
NMPF solution is unable to properly achieve this objective. In fact, the majority of 
increased payments in the NMPF solution come from only a handful of years. Producers 
would still have been left with no indemnity payments in 10 out of 17 years under NMPF 
solution. As Table 5 illustrates, the number of indemnity-paying years is only increased by 
2. The NMPF solution (S3) increases the net indemnity payment (= indemnity - premium) 
by 1805% in 2003 and 2040% in 2013. When only feed cost coefficients are restored (S1), 
the number of years with positive payments remains the same. When only AMS data are 
used (S2), only 5 of 17 years yield positive net payments to producers. For most of other 
years, the percentage increase in net indemnity is less than 10%. Since S2 has marginal 
impact on policy cost compared to S1 and S3, it is not separately analyzed in the remaining 
text.  
This paper addresses the non-smooth payout issue NMPF fails to solve and proposes a 
shallow loss version of the existing MPP-D. The new version, which is referred to as MPP-
DL in the rest of the text, is intended to be a supplemental program to address MPP-D’s 
non-smooth payout issue. A producer can only choose either MPP-D or MPP-DL for a 
given coverage year. MPP-DL also caps an indemnity payment by a user selected level and 
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is priced in such a way that producers would only purchase MPP-DL when margin forecast 
is beyond the coverage range offered by MPP-D. The current program, MPP-D, would still 
be selected when the margin forecast is low but would be deemed too expensive in 
comparison to MPP-DL when the forecast is high. Because MPP-DL pays out in years the 
current program does not, it smooths out payment over the years.  
Table 5 National net indemnity in million dollars based on 2015 - 2016 signup 
 
 National Indemnity Payment Net 
Premium in Million 
 Percentage Increase from 
Current Program 
Year 
 
Current 
S1: 
10% 
Higher 
Feed 
S2: Use 
AMS 
data 
S3: 
NMPF 
solution 
 
S1: 
10% 
Higher 
Feed 
S2: Use 
AMS 
data 
S3: 
NMPF 
solution 
2000  ($20) ($18) ($18) ($15)  9% 3% 24% 
2001  ($20) ($20) ($20) ($20)  0% 0% 1% 
2002  ($12) $8 $9 $50  167% 9% 510% 
2003  $4 $39 $32 $76  871% 18% 1805% 
2004  ($20) ($20) ($20) ($19)  2% 0% 7% 
2005  ($20) ($20) ($20) ($20)  0% 0% 0% 
2006  ($18) ($12) ($17) ($6)  32% 34% 67% 
2007  ($20) ($20) ($20) ($19)  1% 1% 8% 
2008  ($20) ($17) ($20) ($13)  17% 18% 36% 
2009  $858 $1,811 $1,058 $1,938  111% 42% 126% 
2010  ($20) ($17) ($19) ($9)  12% 8% 53% 
2011  ($20) ($19) ($18) $5  8% 2% 125% 
2012  $556 $1,565 $858 $1,996  181% 45% 259% 
2013  $27 $190 $86 $576  604% 55% 2040% 
2014  ($20) ($20) ($20) ($20)  0% 0% 0% 
2015  ($20) ($17) ($19) ($7)  17% 13% 64% 
2016  ($9) $20 ($0) $29  326% 102% 439% 
Cost for years before 2015 assumes 2015 producer sign-up choices. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the use of cumulative prospect theory to model 
producer sign-up choices in MPP-D. Expected utility theory is not able to correctly predict 
about 50% of producer sign-up choices. The model built on cumulative prospect theory 
only fails to explain sign-up choices of about 4% of all producers. To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first paper that applies the cumulative prospect theory pioneered by 
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Tversky & Kahneman (1992) to dairy margin programs. Babcock (2015) introduced the 
concept of loss aversion to modeling risk management behaviors in crop insurance. Sproul 
and Michaud (2017) analyzed field elicited risk attitude parameters from Tanaka, et al. 
(2016) and emphasized the importance of heterogeneity of loss aversion in policy analysis. 
This study allows for risk attitude heterogeneity by modelling U.S. dairy sector as 
consisting of 37 representative producers. Fiscal cost implications are then analyzed using 
representative dairies to model aggregate costs for 4 dairy margin program alternatives.  
2.2 MPP-DL Program Specification 
MPP-DL share most of program specification with MPP-D. One notable addition to MPP-
D is that MPP-DL indemnity payment is capped at a user selected Payment Cap (PC). The 
recommended choice of PC is $1.0/cwt, even though initial analysis in later text includes 
higher payment caps. Serving as a brief review, the rest of the section introduces the shared 
components of MPP-D and MPP-DL.  
The indemnity payment is triggered when a bimonthly average Actual Dairy Production 
Margin (ADPM) falls below a selectable Coverage Level (CL). MPP-D coverage level 
ranges from $4.0/cwt to $8.0/cwt in an increment of 50 cents. MPP-DL coverage level 
extends from MPP-D’s range to $12.0/cwt while maintains the same 50 cents incremental 
change. The formula that determines monthly ADPM is the same in both programs. The 
formula is: 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀 ($ cwt⁄ ) = 𝐴𝑙𝑙-𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ cwt⁄ ) 
−1.0728 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ bu⁄ ) 
−0.00735 × 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ ton⁄ ) 
−0.0137 × 𝐴𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑎 𝐻𝑎𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($/ton) 
(10) 
 
The all-milk, corn and alfalfa hay prices are monthly national average prices reported by 
NASS. The soybean meal price is the monthly average price of high protein soybean meal 
delivered by rail to Dectaur-Central Illinois and can be found in AMS Market News reports.  
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The mechanism that determines the eligible amount of milk production that can be covered 
is kept intact in MPP-DL as well. The base Production History (PH) is the average pounds 
of milk a producer made in 2011 – 2013. PH is increased every year across the nation by a 
fixed percentage that FSA publishes in the summer of every year.  
The actual pounds of milk under coverage depends on another producer-selectable variable 
called Coverage Percentage (CP). The choices of CP are between 25% and 90% with 5% 
apart from one another. The Covered Production History (CPH) determines the actual 
amount of milk under the coverage of MPP-D and MPP-DL. CPH = PH × CP.  
Table 6 MPP-D premium rates 
Coverage 
Level 
($/cwt) 
MPP-D Tier 1 
($/cwt) 
MPP-D Tier 2 
($/cwt) 
$4.00 $0.000 $0.000 
$4.50 $0.010 $0.020 
$5.00 $0.025 $0.040 
$5.50 $0.040 $0.100 
$6.00 $0.055 $0.155 
$6.50 $0.090 $0.290 
$7.00 $0.217 $0.830 
$7.50 $0.300 $1.060 
$8.00 $0.475 $1.360 
 
Both MPP-D and MPP-DL charge two-tiered rates to support smaller producers. The tier 
1 rates apply to covered PH that is less than 4 million pounds. The tier 2 rates apply to the 
portion of covered PH that is above 4 million pounds. For a producer with less than 4 
million-pounds of covered PH, the producer only pays the cheaper tier 1 rate. For a large 
producer whose covered PH crosses the four-million-pound threshold, the effective 
premium rate is a linear combination of tier 1 and tier 2 rates with weights determined by 
how much covered PH is above the threshold. Table 6 above shows MPP-D premium rates 
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for each coverage level. MPP-DL premium rate depends on coverage level and payment 
cap. MPP-DL tier 1 rates can be found in Table 32. The corresponding tier 2 rates are 
reported in Table 33. These numbers are explained in a later section.  
2.3 Data 
This study uses producer level MPP-D signup data obtained from USDA FSA as part of 
research co-op agreement. The data include all records of signup forms CCC-781 and 
CCC-782 MPP-D participants submitted to FSA county offices across the country for 
coverage year 2015 and 2016. Covered production history and selected coverage level are 
two fields of particular interest and used to determine risk attitude parameters. Table 7 
below displays the covered production history break-down by coverage levels in these two 
years.  
Table 7 National covered production history in million pounds for each coverage level in 
million dollars 
 Coverage Level ($/cwt) 
Year 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 
2015 874 4 57 24 246 171 8 30 6 
2016 1402 2 31 9 92 48 2 4 2 
 
Due to the lack of monotonicity in the prospect utility function with respect to the 3 risk 
attitude parameters, brute force search in three-dimensional parameter space is very 
computationally expensive. The problem is compounded by the sheer size of the signup 
dataset. Overall, it is not computationally feasible to find all prospect theory parameters 
for more than 20 thousand operations in the dataset. In light of this limitation, a cohort of 
49 representative operations are created to simplify the fiscal cost analysis. Each 
representative operation features a unique combination of coverage level and covered 
production history. These representative operations are created from the following steps: 
first all operations with 4 million or more covered production history are sorted according 
to the covered production history; then the range of the nation’s covered production 
histories is divided into 5 representative groups with the cut-off covered production history 
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of each group equally apart from one another; third, within each group, a representative 
operation is created for each coverage level with the covered production history being the 
average among those of the same coverage level within the group. These steps create 40 
representative operations. Since not all coverage levels were purchased within each group, 
this number does not reflect the number of combinations among 9 coverage levels and 5 
representative groups. Similarly, additional 9 representatives (corresponding to 9 coverage 
levels) are created among producers with less than 4 million covered production history.  
Other data usage includes NASS all-milk price, NASS and AMS corn prices, NASS and 
AMS alfalfa hay prices, and AMS soybean meal price for calculating realized indemnity 
payments under different programs. For simulating indemnity distributions, daily 
settlement prices on dates closest to the start of (hypothetical or real) coverage years 
between 2008 and 2016 of Class III, Class IV, corn and soybean meal futures and options 
are used.  
2.4 Program Design 
Let the net indemnity under program 𝑀 ∈ {MPP-D, MPP-DL, S1, S3} for coverage level 
𝐶𝐿 and payment cap 𝑃𝐶 be the following: 
 
𝐼𝑗
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝐶𝐿 −
1
2
∑ 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑚
2𝑗
𝑚=2𝑗−1
, 0) , 𝑃𝐶) 
−𝑃𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻) 
(11) 
 
where 𝑚 represents the 𝑚th month in a coverage year and 𝑗 represents the 𝑗th payment 
period; 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑚 is calculated from equation (4) when 𝑀 ∈ {MPP-D, MPP-DL} and from 
equation (9) when 𝑀 ∈ {S1, S3}; 𝐶𝑃𝐻 = 𝐶𝑃×
𝑃𝐻
1,000,000
 is the covered production history 
in million pounds; 𝑃𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻)  denotes the indemnity payment for program 𝑀 . 
When 𝑀 ∈ {MPP-D, S1, S3} , the payment cap 𝑃𝐶 ≡ ∞  and 𝐶𝐿 ∈ {4,4.5,5, … ,7.5,8} . 
When 𝑀 = MPP-DL, the domain of 𝐼𝑗
𝑀 is 
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(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶) ∈ {4,4.5,5, … ,7.5,8}×{∞, 1,1.5,2, . . , 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥}
∪ {8.5,9, … ,11.5,12}×{1,1.5,2, . . , 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥} 
where 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 is the maximum payment cap offered in MPP-DL whose value is yet to be 
determined. For producers, 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥  is assumed known. The insurance premium 
𝑃𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻) in equation (2) is defined as the following: 
 
𝑃𝑀(𝐶𝑃, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻)
= min (
4
𝐶𝑃𝐻
, 1) 𝑟1(𝐶𝑃, 𝑃𝐶)
+ max (1 −
4
𝐶𝑃𝐻
, 0) 𝑟2(𝐶𝑃, 𝑃𝐶) 
(12) 
 
where 𝑟1(∙) and 𝑟2(∙) represent tier 1 and 2 rates respectively. When 𝑀 ∈ {MPP-D, S1, S3}, 
𝑟1(∙) and 𝑟2(∙) take values defined in Table 6. When 𝑀 = 𝑀𝑃𝑃-𝐷𝐿, later text shows that 
𝑟1(∙) takes values reported in Table 32 whereas 𝑟2(∙) takes values defined in Table 33.  
Under Nelson and Loehman (1987) theoretical framework, the insurer’s problem is to solve 
for the maximum available payment cap 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 and the actuarially-fair premium schedule 
(𝑟1 and 𝑟2) to arrive at a Pareto optimal contract. Such a contract is made possible under 
complete and symmetric information. Another important aspect of their framework is that 
under Pareto optimal contract design, producers behave as if they were risk neutral. This 
means actuarially fair premium can be calculated under risk-neutral distribution 
independent of individual producer’s risk preference. However, for time-invariant MPP-
DL premia, this is difficult to achieve even with perfect knowledge about every producer 
in the country. Nelson and Loehman (1987) suggest that one of the second-best solutions 
is to use the average of actuarially fair premiums over the years.  
To determine the time invariant program premia, actuarially fair premia over 2008 to 2017 
are calculated first. Given a coverage level (CL) and payment cap (PC), the actuarially fair 
premium of a given year 𝑡 is the expected value of the indemnity payment: 
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?̃?𝑡
𝑀𝑃𝑃−𝐷𝐿(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶)
=
1
6
𝐸𝑡 [∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝐶𝐿 −
1
2
∑ 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑚
2𝑗
𝑚=2𝑗−1
, 0) , 𝑃𝐶)
6
𝑗=1
] 
(13) 
 
where 𝑗 , 𝑚 , 𝐶𝐿 , 𝑃𝐶 , and 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑚  represent respectively the 𝑗 th bimonthly payment 
period, the 𝑚th month, coverage level, payment cap and the benchmark margin calculated 
from equation (10). The distribution of 𝐴𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑚  is derived by simulating commodity 
futures prices and converting the simulated futures prices to component prices in equation 
(10). Marginal distribution of a single futures is assumed to be log-normal. Their joint 
distribution is modelled by a multivariate Gaussian copula. Simulation details can be found 
in section 1.4. Marginal distributions are calibrated from futures and options settlement 
prices on trading days closest to Dec. 15th in the year proceeding coverage year 𝑡. 
MPP-DL actuarially fair premia for payment cap = $1/cwt and several coverage levels from 
2008 to 2017 are shown in Figure 8. Results for other payment caps are similar and thus 
omitted. Premium variation over the years are more pronounced for middle-range coverage 
levels (~$8.0/cwt). As the coverage level moves away from $8.0/cwt, the premium 
variation becomes more tapered. Premium for the $12.0/cwt coverage level almost reaches 
the payment cap in several years. This suggests that for the upper range coverage levels (> 
8.0/cwt), the payment cap is the upper limit of MPP-DL indemnity and thus restricts the 
otherwise unlimited payment to the cap. For lower range coverage levels, however, the 
coverage level itself is the limiting factor and therefore excludes a vast majority of possible 
ADPM values capable of generating indemnity payments at a higher coverage level.  
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Figure 8 MPP-DL actuarially fair premia with $1.0/cwt payment cap 
Figure 8 also shows that several years with low margin forecasts induce higher actuarially 
fair premia. Because MPP-DL is intended as an alternative program for years of high 
margin forecasts, special exclusion criteria are applied in the derivation of MPP-DL 
premia. The final MPP-DL tier 1 rate for a given CL and CP is the average actuarially fair 
premia of the given CL and CP over the years whose actuarially fair premia are more than 
0.25 standard deviations above the average of the full period. This calculation effectively 
excludes premia in 2009, 2011 and 2013 for all coverage levels and 2012 for lower and 
higher range coverage levels. The resulting tier 1 rates can be found in Table 32 on page 
109. The tier 2 rate is derived from similar calculation but with added exclusion of years 
that are less than 0.25 standard deviations below the average of the whole period. Years 
entered the calculation of tier 2 rates are 2008, 2010, 2015 for all coverage levels, plus 
2012 for middle range coverage levels and 2016 for middle to higher range coverage levels. 
Table 33 on page 110 reports tier 2 rates.  
The determination of 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥, however, is a matter of policymaker’s choice. If 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 is 
set too low, producers may not be enticed to switch to MPP-DL as designed. If 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 is 
set too high, the program may be too expensive for policy makers. Maximum payment caps 
from $1.0/cwt to $5.0/cwt with $0.5/cwt increments are considered. To eliminate some of 
$0.00
$0.25
$0.50
$0.75
$1.00
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
$4.00/cwt $6.00/cwt $8.00/cwt
$10.00/cwt $12.00/cwt
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the payment cap candidates, a simple “Choice Score” is devised such that over the period 
between 2008 and 2016, the score tallies the temporal average of the percent of 
representative dairy operations that choose MPP-D when average annual forecasted margin 
is at or below $8.5/cwt. $8.5/cwt is selected as the threshold for two reasons. First, the 
average monthly realized margin from January 2000 to December 2016 is $8.56/cwt which 
is close to $8.5/cwt. Second, $8.5/cwt is the first coverage level in MPP-DL above the 
maximum coverage level offered in MPP-D. Experiment with the $8.0/cwt threshold does 
not result in any change in score rankings among maximum caps. Table 8 displays the 
“choice score” of each possible maximum payment cap 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥. The $1.0/cwt maximum 
cap incentivizes on average 61% of producers to choose MPP-DL as designed. Ranked 
after $1.0/cwt cap are $1.5/cwt, $2.0/cwt and $3.0/cwt. They managed to make MPP-DL 
favorable among more than 50% of the producers. However, as the maximum payment cap 
𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 reaches $4.5/cwt and $5.0/cwt, the choice score falls below 50% because MPP-DL 
becomes too appealing even at lower coverage levels that are supposed to be only 
preferable under MPP-D.  
Table 8 Evaluation of different maximum payment caps 
Maximum 
Cap 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥  
($/cwt) 
Choice 
Score 
Average 
Annual 
Program Cost 
(in million $) 
Percentage of 
MPP-D 
Average 
Annual Cost 
1.0 61% 303 87% 
1.5 59% 331 96% 
2.0 57% 378 109% 
2.5 56% 436 126% 
3.0 55% 478 138% 
3.5 51% 520 150% 
4.0 48% 574 166% 
4.5 47% 594 171% 
5.0 46% 624 180% 
 
Of particular interest are maximum payment caps at $1.0/cwt, $1.5/cwt, $2.0/cwt and 
$3.0/cwt. To provide further insight on each of those choices, average annual program cost 
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over 2008 - 2016 is calculated for them. The annual program cost for a single year is based 
on the prospect theory model introduced in the next section. The model matches the 2015 
sign-up choices and predicts choices over other years based on estimated producer risk 
attitude parameters. The 9-year average policy cost for MPP-D is 346 million dollars. The 
highest payment occurs in 2009 at 2.4 billion dollars. Compared to MPP-D, the $3.0/cwt 
cap on average costs 37% more than MPP-D and is roughly 20% of the highest payment 
under MPP-D. This makes 𝑃𝐶𝑀𝑎𝑥 = $3.0/cwt a less viable option for policy makers to 
offer. Similar analysis can rule out payment caps $2.0/cwt and $2.5/cwt. Given that the 
result for $1.5/cwt payment cap is not too different from the $1.0/cwt payment cap, 
$1.5/cwt payment cap is also excluded from further analysis.  
2.5 Modeling Producer Risk Attitude with Cumulative Prospect 
Theory 
Expected utility models typically fail to predict risk behaviors. Though capable of 
accounting for risk aversion, they usually lack the ability to express loss aversion in any 
meaningful way. A loss averse producer is more sensitive to the displeasure of loss than to 
the contentment of gain. Loss aversion is consistent with the assumption that producers 
view government sponsored insurance as investment and evaluate insurance outcomes in 
disconnection with its effect on producers’ actual income (Brown, et al., 2008). Loss 
aversion and risk aversion are two similar but different aspects of risk attitude. While loss 
aversion puts different psychological weights on losses and gains that may be induced by 
a same risk factor, risk aversion discriminates against risk regardless of the outcome it may 
produce. Loss aversion and risk aversion are not mutually exclusive. Although a producer 
may not be very risk averse, they may still (risk-seekingly) appreciate the possibilities of 
high rises of milk prices and steep drops of feed costs while at the same time 
disproportionally remain opposed to the loss the opposite may bring.  
The cumulative prospect theory pioneered by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) offers a 
promising framework to model both risk aversion and loss aversion. Two main pieces of 
the cumulative prospect theory are the distortion of the psychological values of loss and 
gain and the unequal weighting of probabilities.  
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Let the annual net indemnity for program 𝑀 equal: 
 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 =
1
6
∑ 𝐼𝑗
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶; 𝐶𝑃𝐻)
6
𝑗=1
 (14) 
 
where 𝐼𝑗
𝑀(∙) is defined in equation (11). 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀  represents insurance gain that equals 
the net indemnity payment over the six payment periods under program 𝑀 with coverage 
level 𝐶𝐿 , payment cap 𝑃𝐶  and covered production history 𝐶𝑃𝐻 . Note that a negative 
𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀  represents a loss. 
The psychological distortion of the gains and losses in the cumulative prospect theory is 
achieved by the value function 𝑣  defined in equation (15) below. Here I adopt the 
specification used by Liu (2013), and Sproul and Michaud (2017): 
 𝑣(𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 ; 𝛼, 𝜆) = {
(𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 )
1−𝛼
, 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 )
1−𝛼
, 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 < 0
 (15) 
 
The reference point to divide gains from losses in 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀  is naturally zero in this 
context. In non-monetary settings, the reference point is usually normalized to zero 
nonetheless. 𝛼  is the risk aversion parameter and controls the curvature of the value 
function. A producer is risk neutral if 𝛼 = 0, risk averse if 𝛼 > 0, or risk seeking if 𝛼 < 0. 
𝜆 is the loss aversion parameter. If 𝜆 = 2, it means the producer views the impact of a loss 
twice significant as the impact of the gain of the same magnitude. Since non-positive 𝜆 
pertains little economic meaning, the parameter is restricted to (0, ∞).  
The unequal weighting of probability is achieved by the following probability weighting 
function.  
 𝑤𝑡(𝑥; 𝛾) =
(𝑝𝑡(𝑥))
𝛾
√(𝑝𝑡(𝑥))𝛾 − (1 − 𝑝𝑡(𝑥))𝛾
𝛾  (16) 
with  
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 𝑝𝑡(𝑥) = {
Pr[𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 ≥ 𝑥] , 𝑥 ≥ 0
Pr[𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀 ≤ 𝑥] , 𝑥 < 0
 (17) 
 
In the above formulation, 𝑥 denotes any possible deterministic value of the annual net 
indemnity payment. 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀  is viewed as a random variable. 𝑝𝑡(𝑥) takes the survival 
distribution value of 𝐺𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝐶𝑃𝐻
𝑀  when 𝑥 is positive and the cumulative distribution value 
when 𝑥 is negative. The subscript 𝑡 denotes the year of the indemnity distribution. Pr [∙] 
denotes the probability function of the distribution. 𝛾  and 𝛿  are probability weighting 
parameters. They are assumed to be positive. When 𝛾 = 1 , the probability weighting 
function returns the actual probability. When 𝛾 < 1 producer overweighs low probability 
events and underweighs high probability events.  
The decision weighting function in prospect theory weighs the phycological value of every 
possible net indemnity. It is defined as 
 𝜋𝑡(𝑥; 𝛾) = {
lim
𝜀→0+
𝑤𝑡(𝑥; 𝛾) − 𝑤𝑡(𝑥 + 𝜀; 𝛾)
𝜀
, 𝑥 ≥ 0
lim
𝜀→0−
𝑤𝑡(𝑥; 𝛾) − 𝑤𝑡(𝑥 + 𝜀; 𝛾)
𝜀
, 𝑥 < 0
 (18) 
 
The role of the decision weighting function is analogous to the role of probabilities under 
expected utility theory. A producer’s “utility” with coverage level 𝐶𝐿, payment cap 𝑃𝐶 and 
covered production history 𝐶𝑃𝐻 under program 𝑀 is defined as below: 
 
𝑉𝑡
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶, 𝐶𝑃𝐻, 𝛼, 𝜆, 𝛾)
= ∫ 𝑣(𝑥; 𝛼, 𝜆, 𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶, 𝐶𝑃𝐻)𝜋𝑡(𝑥; 𝛾, 𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶, 𝐶𝑃𝐻)𝑑𝑥
𝓧
 
(19) 
 
where 𝓧 represents the set of all possible annual net indemnity values; 𝑣(∙) and 𝜋(∙) are 
defined in equation (15) and (18) respectively with 𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶 and 𝐶𝑃𝐻 explicitly expressed 
as parameters. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) only referred to the 𝑉𝑀(∙) function as “a 
number” that orders prospects, which is not informative. In this study, 𝑉𝑀(∙) is thus 
42 
referred to as the prospect utility function to draw reference from the expected utility 
theory.  
The determination of risk attitude parameters is completed through the following 
maximization problem: find all (𝛼𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝛾𝑖) such that  
 𝐶𝐿𝑖 = arg max
𝐶𝐿
𝑉?̃?
𝑀𝑃𝑃-𝐷(𝐶𝐿, ∞, 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑖, 𝛼𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖, 𝛾𝑖)  (20) 
 
where 𝐶𝐿𝑖 and 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑖 are respectively representative 𝑖’s chosen coverage level and covered 
production history; ?̃? = 2015 is the coverage year for which the data are matched. 2016 
data are not used in estimating risk attitude parameters because of the high forecasted 
margin for 2016. Data for that year simply may not show wide variety of risk behaviors 
due to the favorable market outlook (see Table 7).  
As mentioned in section 2.3, I attempt to solve equation (20) for 49 representative 
operations to find their respective set of risk attitude parameters. For 37 of them I am able 
to find at least one set of parameters that satisfy equation (20). Since each representative 
operation represents all producers in the covered production history group who selected 
the same coverage level as the representative did, this loss of representation can be 
evaluated in terms of lost number of represented operations and represented covered 
production histories. In that sense, the prospect theory is unable to account for 4.1% of all 
operations or 2.3% of all milk covered under MPP-D in 2015. To put this loss of 
representation into perspective, the expected utility theory fails to explain sign-up choices 
of 48.9 % of all operations or 34.4% of all milk.  
Because the set of risk attitude parameters that satisfy equation (20) is not unique, producer 
behaviors in other coverage years cannot be uniquely predicted either. Because the true 
distribution of (𝛼𝑖, 𝜆𝑖 , 𝛾𝑖) is not unknown
7, it is not possible to condense the wide range of 
fiscal costs induced by wide range of risk attitude parameter values into an expected value 
                                                 
7 Although all sets of possible risk attitude parameters that are consistent with data are known, there is no 
telling which set is not realistic in real life or agrees with more operations than others. Therefore, the true 
distribution of these parameters is unknown. 
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based on the joint distribution of those parameters. To find a single set of parameters for 
each representative operation, policy cost for other hypothetical coverage years are 
calculated among all possible sets of risk attitude parameters. The set that produces the 
median policy cost over 2008 - 2016 is selected as the representative’s risk attitude 
parameters. These are the years in which realized margins are available and the liquidity 
of Class IV options are high enough for simulation purpose. Among these 37 
representatives, 10 of them are risk neutral and none is risk seeking. These representatives 
also exhibit various degrees of loss aversion. 9 of the representative operations show no 
degree of loss aversion and 5 of them exhibit slight opposite of loss aversion (where 0.7 ≤
𝜆𝑖 ≤ 0.9 ). To bring loss aversion values of other representatives into perspective, I 
benchmarked them with the values from two other studies. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) 
find the median loss aversion value in their study is 2.25 whereas Liu (2013) observes 3.47 
as the median loss aversion value in a separate field elicitation experiment. Among the rest 
21 representative operations who exhibit loss aversion, 20 of them have loss aversion 
parameter higher than 3.47, and 4 have the loss aversion value higher than twice Liu’s 
value. Probability weighting parameter 𝛾𝑖  varies without a pattern. However, 3 
representatives do not seem to psychologically distort actual distribution while the rest of 
them put more emphasis on low probability market scenarios, which is consistent with 
other studies.  
The optimal sign-up choices are solved from equation (21) by assuming 𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝛾𝑖 are 
fixed:  
 (𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡, 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡, 𝑀) = arg max
𝐶𝐿,𝑃𝐶,𝑀
𝑉𝑡
𝑀(𝐶𝐿, 𝑃𝐶;  𝐶𝑃𝐻𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖, 𝜆𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝛿𝑖) , ∀𝑡 ≠ ?̃?  (21) 
where 
𝑀 = {MPP-D, MPP-DL, S1, S3} 
𝑡 ∈ {2008,2009, … ,2013,2014,2016} 
Results of equation (8) and the associated fiscal costs will be discussed in the next section.  
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2.6 Program Evaluation 
The two objectives of MPP-DL are (1) to incentivize producers to choose MPP-DL in years 
when margin forecast is high and (2) to increase indemnity payouts in those years for 
producers who would otherwise purchase MPP-D. The first objective is achieved by the 
design of MPP-DL and evidenced by the choice score introduced in previous text. To 
evaluate the second objective, counterfactual national policy cost based on realized ADPM 
has to be calculated for MPP-DL and MPP-D. This section discusses these policy costs 
over 2008-2016 among MPP-D, MPP-DL and two NMPF solutions.  
Under NMPF’s first suggestion (S1), the coefficients of the feed cost portion of equation 
(10) are restored to the levels before the 10% cut Congress made. Equation (22) below is 
used instead to calculate the ADPM distribution for NMPF’s first suggestion. Under 
NMPF’s second suggestion, the original ADPM formula is maintained but the data source 
for corn and alfalfa hay prices is changed from NASS to AMS Marketing News reports. In 
addition, the soybean meal price is the average of all AMS locations rather than the current 
“Decatur-Central Illinois” location used by MPP-D.  
 
𝐴𝐷𝑃?̃? ($ cwt⁄ ) = 𝐴𝑙𝑙-𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ cwt⁄ ) 
−1.192 × 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ bu⁄ ) 
−0.00817 × 𝑆𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($ ton⁄ ) 
−0.0152 × 𝐴𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑎 𝐻𝑎𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($/ton) 
(22) 
 
National policy cost is used as the measure to compare 4 different programs. It is the sum 
of policy cost for each representative operation. The policy cost for a representative 
operation is the product of the covered production history the operation represents and the 
per-hundredweight indemnity payments based on realized market data and optimal choices 
under its risk attitude parameter values.  
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Table 9 Comparison of national policy cost in million dollars 
Year 
Average 
Forecasted 
Margin 
($/cwt) 
Realized 
Average 
Margin 
($/cwt) 
MPP-D 
Alone 
(mil $) 
MPP-DL 
with MPP-D 
(mil $) 
S1: NMPF 
10% Feed 
Cost 
(mil $) 
S3: NMPF 
Full Solution 
(mil $) 
2008 9.48 8.55 (44) (24) (54) 16 
2009 6.78 4.55 2426 1860 3619 4399 
2010 8.62 8.28 (62) 47 (45) 27 
2011 5.77 8.86 (386) (295) (339) 117 
2012 7.71 5.31 979 906 2824 4221 
2013 6.53 7.15 302 234 1933 2743 
2014 10.41 13.31 (26) (129) (40) (68) 
2015 8.36 8.30 (65) 40 (71) 50 
2016 8.85 8.18 (7) 86 112 225 
Average   346 303 882 1303 
Std. Dev.   867 673 1498 1920 
Shaded rows indicate the years when forecasted margins are above MPP-D insurable 
range. 
 
Table 9 above reports national policy costs for all four programs. Positive numbers in the 
table represent positive net indemnity payments to producers. Aggregate net indemnities 
are negative in those years in which the realized margin finished unexpectedly above MPP-
D’s insurable range (≤ $8/cwt). These years are 2008, 2011, and 2014. In all these years, 
the best hindsight strategy is to select the free $4.0/cwt coverage. In 2008 or 2014, the 
forecasted margin that guides sign-up choices is already above the historical average 
margin ($8.56/cwt) and thus prompts many to choose the free $4.0/cwt coverage. However, 
the presence of risk aversion and loss aversion can deviate producer behaviors from such 
profit-maximizing choice and lead many to choose other coverage levels. In 2011 when 
producers received the least payment from MPP programs, the forecasted margin is below 
historical average and induces a lot of producers to buy higher coverage levels. What makes 
2011 very unprofitable is that the margin ends up above the historical average. Those who 
select buy-up coverages cannot get their premium recovered through indemnity payments. 
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This is possibly why 2011 pays the least among two other years when realized margin is 
high. 
The most expensive coverage year to policy makers is 2009 when the average realized 
margin is 33% lower than the forecasted margin around sign-up time. In 2009, all four 
programs pay out more than 1 billion nationally. The full NMPF solution costs 4.4 billion 
dollars in that year alone. In comparison, the stand-alone MPP-D would spend $2.4 billion. 
With the addition to MPP-DL, possibly due to risk aversion among some producers who 
prefer the less profitable MPP-D in that year, the MPP-D/DL combination reduces the 
payout to $1.9 billion. 
On average, MPP-DL with MPP-D as an option costs the least to policy makers while the 
full NMPF solution costs the most. The annual cost of the stand-alone MPP-D is 346 
million dollars. The two NMPF programs cost more than twice MPP-D with the full NMPF 
solution skyrocketing to a whopping $1.3 billion. In general, MPP-DL as an addition to 
MPP-D has a smoothing effect on program payout over the period inspected here. The 
standard deviation among annual program payout is at the lowest with MPP-DL and at the 
highest with NMPF full solution.  
Such smoothing effect MPP-DL brings allows it to achieve the second objective: MPP-DL 
pays out more in years when margin forecast suggests MPP-D coverage range does not 
offer effective protection. Among the five years that meet this criterion, except 2014, MPP-
DL is able to offer more indemnity payout than stand-alone MPP-D. Notably in 2010, 2015 
and 2016 when margin forecast is around the historical average, MPP-DL increases MPP-
D payout to positive zones8. The other program that is able to achieve the same result is 
the full NMPF solution. However, due to its high cost to policy makers, the program is not 
recommended by this study.  
                                                 
8 Besides the fact that $4.0/cwt is the only “profitable” (as in $0/cwt profit rather than loss) choice for 2014 
when maximum insurable margin is $8.0/cwt, MPP-DL’s maximum coverage level of $12/cwt with $1/cwt 
payment cap may contribute to its high loss in that year compared to theother three programs. Had the 
coverage level raised to $14/cwt, MPP-DL may be slightly more profitable.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
This paper proposes MPP-DL as a shallow loss version of the dairy title margin insurance 
program MPP-D. The new program is a supplemental program to the existing MPP-D 
established in the 2014 Farm bill. MPP-DL offers coverage from $4.0/cwt to $12.0/cwt 
with maximum payout limited at $1.0/cwt. The primary design objective for MPP-DL is to 
address policy makers’ concern that the existing MPP-D does not pay enough in years 
when margin forecast is above 8.0/cwt.  
Empirical analysis condenses the sign-up information of more than 20,000 producers in 
MPP-D coverage year 2015 into 37 representative operations, and then estimates 
cumulative prospect theory risk attitude parameters of the representatives. With the risk 
attitude parameters at hand, counterfactual sign-up behaviors in other coverage years are 
predicted. Fiscal costs of variations of MPP-D are analyzed after. 
The results show that both MPP-DL and a solution proposed by National Milk Producers 
Federation (NMPF) are able to increase insurance payout in years that margin forecasts are 
above MPP-D insurable range. However, NMPF’s “rising tide lifts all boats” approach also 
increases payout for other years and can put considerable fiscal burden on federal budget. 
MPP-DL on the other hand is able to reduce the overall cost of dairy title program with a 
more smoothed payment stream over the years.  
This paper estimates representative operations risk attitude parameters from two observed 
sign-up choice variables. Producer heterogeneity can be further achieved with additional 
variables (i.e. producer locations, financial situations) to achieve better representation and 
more accurate risk attitude parameter values. A field elicitation experiment across the 
country may also provide better estimates of risk attitude parameters. These potential 
improvements may broaden the ability of the cumulative prospect theory model used in 
this study to explain more, if not all, representatives’ choices.   
48 
3 Asymmetric Price Transmission in U.S. Fluid Milk 
Markets 
3.1 Introduction 
Asymmetric price transmission is not only an economic intrigue among scholars but a 
matter of practical implications for market participants and policy makers. Among a series 
of stylized facts, Li, Sexton and Xia (2006) claimed that “Transmission of farm price 
changes to retail is (i) delayed, (ii) incomplete, and (iii) asymmetric.” Asymmetry usually 
manifests itself in how retailers react to changes in farm price. Retail prices are described 
by Peltzman (2000) as “rise faster than they fall”. Since Kinnucan and Forker (1987) 
seminal work that supported the claim of price asymmetry in U.S. dairy markets, 
asymmetric transmission has been the default assumption for almost all empirical studies 
in the dairy filed. Awokuse and Wang (2009) later take advantage of advances in threshold 
cointegration analysis and reconfirm Kinnucan and Forker’s results. Further more, 
Peltzman (2000) extended asymmetry claim to include hundreds of producer and consumer 
goods beyond the dairy sector.  
As pointed out by Peltzman (2000), prevalent economic theories do not explain why retail 
price reacts to one kind of farm price shocks faster than the other. Empirical studies on 
asymmetric transmission may indicate inadequacies of our theories. Asymmetric price 
transmission could also suggest that retailers reap the benefit at the expense of consumers 
and producers. Among many speculated causes of asymmetry in the literature is the retailer 
market power along value chain. Increased retail market concentration with the emergence 
of mega grocery stores and national chains may force price reactions to become 
inconsistent with competitive market results. Xia and Sexton (2009), Bolotova & 
Novakovic (2005), and Carman and Sexton (2005) found varying degrees of retailer 
oligopoly/monopoly in several U.S. dairy markets. If retailer market power is confirmed 
as a contributing factor to asymmetric price transmission, lowering farm-gate price may 
not translate to consumer welfare in its fullness or in a timely fashion. Consequently, milk 
producers may not receive adequate feedback from retail markets to adjust short term 
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production through changes in feed ration. Sexton, et al. (2003) argued that retailer market 
power can press commodity prices downwards and divert more fresh produce to lower-
valued uses. With changing consumer taste and ample choices of non-dairy beverages9 
gaining popularity, milk producers are facing competition that did not exist decades ago. 
On top of the competition from non-dairy beverages, asymmetric price transmission may 
add another layer of complication to producer profitability. “The person in the street” – the 
industry folks Peltzman (2000) facetiously referred to – observes increasing empirical 
evidence to justify their concerns about alternative labeled-as-milk beverages. The year-
to-date volume share of all non-dairy beverages in 2016 is increased by 5.4% while the 
total fluid milk sales volume declined by 1.9% (Dairy Management Inc., 2016). 
This study sets to empirically test asymmetric price transmission in U.S. retail fluid milk 
markets. Fifteen most populous Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) are selected for this 
study. The novelty of this study is the empirical methods used. A two-threshold three-
regime error correction model is first employed to investigate threshold cointegration 
relation between the retail price of a product type in one MSA and the corresponding Class 
I milk price. Then panel technique pertains to large data time series is used to test 
hypothesis of symmetry in each MSA.  
Among empirical methods that appear in asymmetric price transmission literatures, the 
Houck model (Houck, 1977) was the first widely accepted specification in which 
downstream price change is regressed on cumulative positive and negative changes in 
upstream price. Ward (1982) made the Houck model more operational by including lagged 
terms of upstream prices. Separately, von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1996) added a (non-
split) error correction term to Ward’s specification. Splitting the error correction term soon 
followed in Granger and Lee (1989). In an attempt to unify Houck type models and error 
correction methods, Capps and Sherwell (2007) argued that an error correction 
specification developed by von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1999) nests the Houck 
approach and comparisons between the two methods show “statistically indistinguishable” 
                                                 
9 Non-dairy beverages include almond, soy, coconut, cashew, rice milk, chocolate drinks, goat milk, 
Horchata drinks. 
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results in U.S. dairy markets. An interesting “outlier” study to mention here is Xia and 
Sexton (2009) who applied a symmetry test model developed by Chavas and Mehta (2004) 
but found that asymmetry is statisticially insignificant in fluid milk markets of all four 
California cities they studied. Chavas and Mehta (2004) themselves applied the method to 
the U.S. butter market and found strong evidence for asymmetry. All these models 
mentioned above and analyzed in Capps and Sherwell (2007) assume the threshold that 
splits the variable is zero. Enders and Dibooglu (2001) broke such convention and 
estimated several one-threshold two-regime models. Goodwin & Piggott (2001) estimated 
a one-threshold three-regime model where the two regime cut-off points share a same 
absolute value. To my best knowledge, Jeon and Seo (2003) are the first to use one-
threshold two-regime Threshold Vector Error Correction Model (TVECM-12) in empirical 
work. Meyer (2004) brought forth the use of TVECM-12 into price transmission studies. 
Other notable studies with this method are Balcombe, et al., (2007), Ben-Kaabia and Gil 
(2007), and Rezitis and Reziti (2011). As an interesting addition to the empirical TVECM-
12 applications, Park, et al., (2007) developed time-varying thresholds deduced from 
estimated TVECM thresholds. However, they did not split error correction terms by those 
time-varying thresholds possibly due to conventional tests’ inability to check if 
cointegration remains under time-varying thresholds. Fitting time-varying thresholds into 
TVECM framework requires further econometric research. Recently, Loy, et al., (2015) 
employed a two-threshold three-regime error correction specification to study asymmetric 
price transmission in German milk and butter markets.  
As mentioned before, the contribution of this study is primarily methodological. This 
study’s methods provide a ready-to-use recipe to empirically test asymmetry for large time 
series datasets. First, to my best knowledge, this study is the first to apply two-threshold 
error correction models to U.S. fluid milk markets. A band of no-reaction is explicitly built 
into the model with adequate tests to assure underlying econometric properties and model 
selection. The threshold error correction model used in this study is close to the one Loy, 
et al., (2015) employed. One major difference from Loy, et al., (2015) is the extensive care 
this study takes to account for structural breaks in price series. The premise of error 
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correction model is the linear long-term relationship between two price series. The 
presence of structural break can easily break such assumption. Second, this is the first study 
to use Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator to study panel effects 
of asymmetric price transmission in the U.S. fluid milk markets. Only recently developed 
by Chudik & Pesaran (2015), an autoregressive distributed lag panel data model is used to 
investigate this topic based on threshold results from individual retail-farm price pairs.  
This paper is organized as such: the next section introduces the empirical framework of 
price asymmetry that methods of this study belong to. The paper then offers a general 
description of the data used in this study as well as the data manipulation involved prior to 
formal empirical analysis. The next section delves into several aspects of the empirical 
analysis with detailed steps of each method and results after performing them. A discussion 
of the symmetry test results follows after.  
3.2 Empirical Framework 
There are several aspects of asymmetric price transmission that the literature has studied 
so far. The speed of price transmission measures how fast downstream price reacts to 
upstream price change in one direction than another. Peltzman (2000) statement “Prices 
rise faster than they fall” is a statement about different speed of such price reaction. The 
magnitude of price transmission characterizes the extent of downstream price reaction to 
an upstream price change. A statement like “downstream price adjusts fully to upstream 
price hikes but not upstream price decline” is a statement about the transmission 
magnitude. Traditionally, the Houck method is used to look at the speed and magnitude of 
asymmetric price response. A typical example of a classic Houck model is this: 
 Δ𝑅𝑡 = 𝑎 + ∑ 𝑏j
+Δ𝐹𝑡−𝑗
+
𝑞1
𝑗=0
+ ∑ 𝑏j
−Δ𝐹𝑡−𝑗
−
𝑞2
𝑗=0
+ 𝑣𝑡 (23) 
 
where Δ𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡−1  is the change in downstream price for time period 𝑡 ; Δ𝐹𝑡
+ =
∑ max(𝐹𝑠 − 𝐹𝑠−1, 0)
𝑡
𝑠=1  is the cumulative positive shocks in upstream price with 𝐹𝑡 being 
the downstream price for period 𝑡 ; similarly Δ𝐹𝑡
− = ∑ max(𝐹𝑠−1 − 𝐹𝑠, 0)
𝑡
𝑠=1  is the 
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cumulative negative shocks in upstream price; and 𝑣𝑡  is the error term. 𝑏j
+  and 𝑏j
−  are 
speed parameters. Comparison between the m is the main analytical tool to study 
asymmetry speed. The magnitude of the asymmetry is measured by the sum of the speed 
parameters ∑ 𝑏j
+
𝑗=0  and ∑ 𝑏j
−
𝑗=0 . Asymmetry is usually tested against the hypothesis that 
∑ 𝑏j
+
𝑗=0 = ∑ 𝑏j
−
𝑗=0 . 
Asymmetry can also be termed “positive” or “negative”. Positive asymmetry refers to the 
speed and/or the magnitude of the downstream price reaction to the upstream price increase 
is more intense than those to upstream price decrease. In other words, if margin decline 
causes stronger downstream price reaction, the asymmetry is positive. In a Houck model, 
∑ 𝑏j
+
𝑗=0 > ∑ 𝑏j
−
𝑗=0  serve as evidence of positive asymmetry.  
As simple and effective as the Houck method is, it fell out of favor in asymmetry literature 
once advances in cointegration analysis bore fruit in non-linear threshold regime models. 
Cointegration models, with its most common Error Correction Model (ECM) specification, 
have unique advantage over the Houck method. If cointegrating relationship is present in 
the data, ECM directly models the long-term transmission relationship between two prices. 
Short term deviates from the long-term relationship is either explicitly or implicitly 
parameterized into the model. The long-term transmission relationship engrained in the 
model can be empirically tested via various cointegration tests. ECM is particularly primed 
to model positive / negative asymmetry due to the explicit parameterization of the short-
term deviation (or the error correction term). One thing worth noting however is that the 
existence of a long-term transmission relationship assumes the two prices do not drift away 
or collide into each other over long period of time. This essentially “models” out the 
possibility of varying magnitude of asymmetric price transmission. Therefore, 
cointegration models can only test for the speed of asymmetry. In empirical studies, 
cointegration model is only appropriate if the dataset passes cointegration tests. Otherwise, 
the rejection of a stable long-term price dynamic necessitates the use of the Houck method.  
This study employs a two-threshold three-regime error correction model. Aside from the 
advantage it has over the Houck method, it is also capable of modeling a band of no-
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reaction when changes fall between the two thresholds. Figure 10 adopted from Meyer 
(2004) provides a visual illustration of this point: smaller deviations from long-run 
equilibrium do not trigger price reactions. Such behavior can be plausible in the presence 
of retailer menu cost. Fear of losing market share and the associated cost of changing 
signage, retailers may not find price adjustment appealing if changes in upstream price is 
small.  
 
Figure 9 Error correction term on price adjustment 
Let 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡 denote respectively monthly retail and farm-gate prices for milk type 𝑖 in 
month 𝑡  in one single geographic area. If 𝑅𝑖𝑡  and 𝐹𝑖𝑡  are threshold cointegrated with 
thresholds 𝛾𝑖
𝐿 and 𝛾𝑖
𝑈 (𝛾𝑖
𝐿 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝑈), they admit the following error correction specification: 
 ΔRit = 𝛼𝑖
0 + 𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑈𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑈 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑗ΔRi,t−j
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑗ΔFi,t−j
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
+ 𝑣𝑖𝑡 (24) 
 
∀𝑡 ∈ {𝑠 ∈ [1, 𝑇]: 𝑢𝑖𝑠 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝐿 𝑜𝑟 𝑢𝑖𝑠 > 𝛾𝑖
𝑈} 
 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator; 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is the regression error term; the lower and 
upper regime error correction terms 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐿  and 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑈  are defined as the following 
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑢𝑖𝑡≤𝛾𝑖
𝐿  
ΔRit 
ห𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑈 ห ห𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 ห 
𝛾𝑖
𝐿 𝛾𝑖
𝑈 
Lower Regime Upper Regime 
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𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑈 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑢𝑖𝑡>𝛾𝑖
𝑈  
 
with 𝑢𝑖𝑡 being the error correction term, and indicator function 𝐼𝐴 = 1 if 𝐴 is true or = 0 
otherwise. The speed of price transmission (𝜃𝑖
𝐿 or 𝜃𝑖
𝑈) in each regime is the slope of the 
dashed line in Figure 10. The lower regime (where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝛾𝑖
𝐿) corresponds to the cases 
when upstream price is increased. Therefore, positive asymmetric transmission in this 
context means ห𝜃𝑖
𝐿ห > ห𝜃𝑖
𝑈ห.  
Under Engle-Granger two-step cointegration procedure, the error correction term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the 
residual from the long-run equilibrium regression of 𝑅𝑖𝑡 on 𝐹𝑖𝑡. Note that equation (24) 
does not have a middle regime term 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝛾𝑖
𝐿<𝑢𝑖𝑡≤𝛾𝑖
𝑈 . Besides the economic 
interpretation of the band of no-reaction, the omission also has its econometric reason. For 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 to be stationary, only the outer regimes need to be well behaved (Chan, et al., 1985, and 
Balke and Fomby, 1997). The middle regime can exhibit non-convergent or unit root 
behavior. Equation (24) also nests the one-threshold two-regime model when 𝛾𝐿 = 𝛾𝑈. 
Since farm-gate prices under Federal and California milk marketing orders are derived 
from component prices in previous month, I also include the contemporaneous farm-gate 
price term ΔFi,t on the right-hand side of equation (24). This is why the lagged term Δ𝐹𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 
starts at 𝑗 = 0 instead of 1. 
For a specific type of milk, the null hypothesis of symmetric transmission is phrased like 
below: 
 𝐻0
𝑖 : 𝜃𝑖
𝐿 = 𝜃𝑖
𝐻 (25) 
 
For the entire geographic region, the hypothesis of symmetric transmission is instead 
 𝐻0:
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝐿
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑈
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (26) 
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where 𝑁 denotes the number of milk product types in the region. 𝐻0  tests the average 
(symmetric) effect of price transmission in a region.  
3.3 Data Analysis 
This study uses Nielsen Retail Scanner data in 15 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) to 
analyze price transmission. Farm-gate prices are California Class I milk price for three 
California MSAs and Class I milk price of appropriate Federal Milk Market order for the 
other regions. Temporary Sales Prices (TSP) are detected by Chahrour (2011) filter. 
Individual series are aggregated to sales-weighted series for each product type within an 
MSA. Two separate datasets are produced to compare the effect TSP has on transmission. 
The first dataset is created after aggregating UPC level prices with TSP excluded. The 
second is produced with TSP retained. Due to similarities in these two datasets, time series 
property tests only report results of the TSP-excluded dataset. Unless otherwise noted in 
the text, readers can assume these test results speak for the TSP-included dataset as well. 
Details of temporary sales price and price aggregation are explained in subsections 3.3.2 
and 3.3.3.  
3.3.1 Data Description 
The retail price data used in this study come from Nielsen Retail Scanner Dataset. The 
dataset includes weekly price and sales volume of 8,234 milk products in retail locations 
across the United States. A product is defined by a Universal Product Code (UPC) and 
packaging size10. The available time periods at the onset of this study span from the first 
week of 2006 to the last week  of 2014. Depending on the region, the farm level price may 
be either the Class I milk price for a Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO) or California 
Class I price. 
Among the 8,234 milk products, many are only sold in regional markets. Some products 
are excluded due to short price series or unconventional product attributes such as 0.5% fat 
                                                 
10 Companies sometimes use a same UPC for milk sold in bottles of different sizes. Neilson scanner dataset 
assigns a version number to each UPC to deal with such situation. 
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content. Organic products are also removed from this study because of the different cost 
structure compared to regular milk products. After further data manipulations detailed in 
the next two subsections, the total number of products in the 15 regions studied is 2,898.  
3.3.2 Temporary Sales Price 
Price promotion and royalty discounts are common tools retailers use to increase sales. 
However, these price cuts are usually temporary and have nothing to do with fluctuations 
in wholesale price or production cost. Most literatures refer to these price cuts Temporary 
Sales Prices (TSP). TSP can be described by two measures: frequency and depth. 
Frequency measures how often TSP occurs while depth measures the difference between 
TSP and regular price. Volpe (2013) argued that competition among retailers affects both 
frequency and depth. Hosken and Reiffen (2004) examined 20 categories of perishable 
foods sold in U.S. and found that 25% - 50% of annual price variance for most categories 
can be attributed to TSP. In an empirical study of butter products in Germany, Tifaoui and 
Cramon-Taubadel (2016) showed that the inclusion of TSP makes price recovery from 
reduced retail price look more rapid and hence increases the appearance of asymmetric 
price transmission. They pointed out that TSP exaggerates the temporary deviation 
between retail price and wholesale price, and creates the illusion that the retail profit margin 
is squeezed from upstream value chain. When the retailer removes sales promotion after a 
short period, it would appear in empirical analysis that the reduced margin is corrected in 
a rapid fashion. Given that retail-driven temporary price increase is less common than TSP, 
retail price data typically do not feature quicker correction of temporary price hikes and 
therefore exhibit different reactions from margin expansion compared to the case of 
squeezed margin.  
Though the literatures appear to agree on the distortion factor of TSP in price transmission 
studies, the research field still has not reached a consensus on proper ways of dealing with 
TSP in data analysis. In their extended study of the topic, Tifaoui and Cramon-Taubadel 
(2016) categorized various methods into two groups. The goal of either group is 
nonetheless to separate a price series into two components: the regular price component 
and the sales price component. The first group of methods focuses on the definition of sales 
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prices and removes them from a price series. The method used in Hosken and Reiffen 
(2004) falls into this group. The second group redirects a researcher’s attention to what 
constitutes a regular price and seeks to preserve those in a time series. Tifaoui and Cramon-
Taubadel (2016) argued that though the first group of methods is straight forward they 
usually incorporate some arbitrary components, such as the 10% sales price cut-off point 
in Hosken and Reiffen (2004). Those methods also implicitly assume temporary price hikes 
do not exist. In comparison, methods in the second group are usually robust against 
different values of parameters up to a certain extent and admits spurious price hikes. For 
example, Tifaoui and Cramon-Taubadel (2016) mentioned that the width of their modal 
price window is robust between 9 to 17 weeks. The method Tifaoui and Cramon-Taubadel 
used is the Chahrour method (Chahrour, 2011), which forms the basis of the method used 
in this study. 
The Chahrour method utilizes a 13-week moving window centered at the week under 
evaluation and calculates the modal price based on prices within that window as the 
reference price for the week. The size of the window is consistent with the 2.66 months of 
regular price duration found in Narasimhan, et al. (1996). In a published online appendix 
of the paper, Chahrour detailed four special adjustments to the modal price when the modal 
price suddenly changes from a previous period.  
The basis of the Chahrour method is the assumption that the regular price component of a 
retail price series fluctuates infrequently. Graphically this assumption translates to the 
presence of many visible plateaus among downward spikes or trenches in time series plot. 
For example, Figure 11 is a typical example of a price series assumed under the Chahrour 
method. Although price in the graph dips periodically at high frequency, several price 
plateaus are still visibly present even to a casual observer. While many price series in 
Nielsen retailer scanner dataset resemble the one in Figure 11, many others do not share 
the same look of price stickiness and regions of flat progression. Figure 12 shows the price 
of the same product sold in a different store of the same region. The price series in Figure 
12 would render the Chahrour method ineffective since a modal price can no longer 
represent the “common theme” of price movement in the 13-week window. For many price 
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points in the series plotted in Figure 12, a unique modal price does not even exist. Chahrour 
resolved this issue by assigning the first modal price in the order of appearance as the 
reference price. His resolution does not work too well if the number of occurrence of 
competing modal prices in the 13-week window is very low. In an extreme case where all 
13 prices are different, the Chahrour method uses the price that is 6 weeks earlier as the 
reference price. Another issue the Chahrour method has with price series like the one in 
Figure 12 is that it would exclude too many price points. The series shown in Figure 12 
would lose 73% of the 251 price points if exclusion takes place when the observed price 
does not equal the reference price.  
Because of these two issues, I made two changes to the Chahrour method. First, I used 
average price instead of the modal price if the occurrence of competing modal prices is less 
than 4 weeks (~25% of the window width). Second, exclusion criterion is loosened such 
that only sales price of more than 10% below the reference price and spurious price hike 
of more than 15% of the reference price are removed from further analysis. However, due 
to the use of these two arbitrage cut-off thresholds (the 10% and 15%), data with sales 
prices retained are separately analyzed to study the impact the price filter has on 
asymmetric transmission. 
 
Figure 10 Sample price series 1 
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Figure 11 Sample price series 2 
3.3.3 Product Type and Price Aggregation 
After purging sales prices from every series, I aggregated price series by product types to 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. The resulting set of series consists of sales-
weighted monthly prices of each product type in every MSA. Due to the use of 13-week 
moving window in the process of determining sales prices, price observations in the first 
and last two months are excluded from subsequent analysis. The final dataset used in 
threshold analysis represents about 24 - 27 product types in each of the 15 MSA’s from 
March 2006 to Oct 2014. In other words, a balanced panel of 24 – 27 products with 104 
monthly time series observations is constructed for each MSA. Totally number of series is 
387. Summary statistics about each product type can be found in Table 34 on page 111.  
There are several problems such aggregation addresses. First, the granularity of Nielsen 
retail scanner data is much higher than that of Class I milk price. Nielsen offers weekly 
sales-weighted average price series whereas Class I milk is published every month. Second, 
the sheer size of Nielsen retailer scanner data makes it very difficult to run panel data 
analysis that includes every individual price series. The average number of price series in 
an MSA is 32,226. Given that threshold estimation involves gird search, this large number 
of series simply renders analysis based on individual series computationally infeasible.  
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Table 10 Price series count in each MSA 
MSA Principal City 
Number 
of Series 
Product 
Count 
New York-Newark-Jersey City, NY-NJ-PA New York 1,079,814 918 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Log Angeles 700,208 487 
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI Chicago 523,839 510 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX Dallas 345,896 446 
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX Houston 330,767 389 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD Philadelphia 335,740 569 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL Miami 184,932 312 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA Atlanta 297,518 481 
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH Boston 255,647 396 
San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA San Francisco 220,330 399 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ Phoenix 259,015 353 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Riverside 205,719 474 
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI Detroit 168,390 280 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Seattle 271,141 411 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI MPLS-St Paul 180,498 444 
 
To narrow down price observations to a manageable size but still preserve product 
heterogeneity, I picked 15 most populous MSA’s and grouped individual products into 32 
product types. Product types are defined by the following set of attributes: product size, 
container type, lactose-free label and fat content. I further excluded price series that does 
not offer conventional values of any of those attributes. For example, product size is only 
limited to the three most common retail sizes: 32 oz., 64 oz. and 128 oz. (1 gallon). Table 
35 on page 112 describes permissible values for all attributes in detail. The number of 
product types does not equal the theoretical number of combinations of attribute values. 
This is because many combinations do not exist or the corresponding price series does not 
span all months. For example, it is not common to see a one-gallon lactose-free whole milk 
sold in a plastic container.  
The decision to include the four attributes in the definition of product type is assisted by a 
machine learning technique called Random Forest (Breiman, 2001). I started with a larger 
set of product attributes that also includes kosher designation and various vitamin labels 
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marketed on containers. All these attribute values are parsed from UPC descriptions 
Nielsen retail scanner dataset offers.  
 
Figure 12 Temporal progression of product attribute significance with sales prices 
excluded 
The technical details of random forest are not of interest to this study. The basic idea behind 
random forest is to “grow” decision trees with bootstrap sampling on random subsets of all 
observations. A decision tree separates observations by attribute values in binary fashion, 
i.e. is container size 32 oz. or not. In this study, the tree keeps splitting observations until 
doing so no longer decreases the lack of fitness by a factor of 1%. In the context of 
determining product types, the method identifies the most obvious price differentiators 
among other product attributes. A typical question the random forest can answer is, do 
price points cluster around different values of a product attribute given other attributes 
equal. To reduce temporal effect on shifting price clustering, I separated the entire dataset 
into weekly slices and ran random forest on each slice once at a time. A measure called 
mean decrease in accuracy can be calculated for each variable after a forest is constructed. 
A product attribute is a meaningful price differentiator if its mean decrease in accuracy is 
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large in comparison to other attributes. Figure 13 shows time progression of mean decrease 
in accuracy of all product attributes when sales prices are excluded. It is very clear in Figure 
13 that three attributes stand out in their importance of separating prices in all weekly 
periods. These three attributes are product size, container type and lactose-free label. These 
attributes remain significant when sales prices are retained. On top of those attributes, I 
also included fat content because milk is horizontally differentiated by fat content at retail 
level (Davis, et al. 2012 and Xia & Sexton 2009).   
3.4 Empirical Analysis 
After the detection of temporary sales prices and the aggregation of individual series by 
product type and geographic region, I ran extensive tests on the aggregated panel series. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are performed on individual series in each panel. 
Due to the appearance of structural breaks in many series, HTL structural break unit root 
tests (Harvey, et al., 2013) are carried out on individual series. Choi panel unit root tests 
(Choi, 2001) with modifications to account for cross sectional dependence proposed by 
Demetrescu, et al. (2006) are then performed to check for panel unit roots. These tests 
suggest that both the retailer price and farm-gate price are I(1) processes.  
Subsequently, the original Engle-Granger two-step cointegration tests are performed on 
individual series. Structural break cointegration tests of Gregory and Hansen (1996) and 
Hatemi-J (2008) are then executed. Individual series cointegration effect cannot be 
confirmed by these tests. In light of these test results, Westerlund (2007) method is used 
on panels and confirms panel cointegration in 13 of 15 panels.  
Due to possible misspecification issue, Enders and Siklos (2001) threshold cointegration 
tests are used to test threshold cointegration on individual series. The test is extended to 
two-threshold models with structural breaks and unknown breakpoints. Thresholds are also 
estimated in the test by procedures described in Chan (1993). Because the distributions of 
test statistics are not known, critical values are simulated by Monte Carlo simulation 
detailed in Enders and Siklos (2001) with modifications consistent with methods in 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Hatemi-J (2008). Threshold cointegration tests show that 
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most regions sport more than 90% of individual price pairs that are threshold cointegrated. 
Once thresholds are estimated and threshold cointegration is confirmed, Common 
Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimators are obtained on panel series. Tests 
on symmetry are based on CCEMG estimators. The rest of the section explains details of 
these tests and their results.  
3.4.1 Unit Root Tests 
Cointegration requires both the retail and farm-gate price series to be integrated of order 
one (𝐼(1)). ADF results suggest that both California and FMMO Class I series are indeed 
𝐼(1) processes. This finding is further confirmed by a separate run of KPSS (Kwiatkowski, 
et al., 1992) tests. Because test results from individual retail series do not benefit from the 
extra information provided by cross sections, panel unit root tests are carried out for retail 
price series. In what follows is a brief literature review of panel unit root tests before details 
of the test adopted in this study is given.  
A pooled version of ADF test on panel data was developed by Lavin and Lin (LL) in 1992, 
and later published in Lavin and Lin (2002) with improvements. Implicitly assumed in the 
pooled model of Lavin and Lin (2002) is that each cross section follows a same data 
generating process. Due to this restriction, the LL test suffers low power and is of limited 
use. The IPS test (Im, et al., 2003) relaxes this restriction and allows for different ADF t-
statistics for each cross-section. However, the asymptotic results of IPS depend on the 
assumption that the number of cross sections (𝑁) goes to infinity, whereas in time series 
analysis, it is more appropriate to assume the number of time periods (𝑇) approaches 
infinity. Maddala and Wu (1999) subsequently proposed to use Fisher’s 𝑝𝜆-test (Fisher, 
1932) for such reason. Choi (2001) considered not only the case where 𝑁 is fixed as 𝑇 →
∞ but also the case where both 𝑁 and 𝑇 approach infinity. Literatures up to Choi (2001) 
assume cross section independence. This assumption is unrealistic in this study where each 
cross section represents a milk product type sold within a single geographic region. There 
is no reason to believe that the price of a carton of 2% milk does not correlate with the 
price of a carton of whole milk sold next to it. Demetrescu, et al. (2006) made a 
modification to Choi (2001) to account for cross section dependence.  
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According to Demetrescu, et al. (2006), the test statistic for the null hypothesis that all 
series in the panel have unit roots is: 
 𝑡0.2 = (∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 ) √𝑁 + (𝑁2 − 𝑁) ∙ (?̂?∗ +
1 − ?̂?∗
5
√
2
𝑁 + 1
)⁄  ~ 𝒩(0,1) (27) 
 
with  
?̂?∗ = max (−
1
𝑁 − 1
, ?̂?) , ?̂? = 1 −
1
𝑁 − 1
∑ (𝑡𝑖 −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑡𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
 
𝑡𝑖 = Φ
−1(𝑝𝑖) 
 
where 𝑁  represents the number of cross sections; 𝑝𝑖  is the p-value of a unit root test 
statistic for series 𝑖; Φ−1(∙) denotes the inverse standard normal cumulative distribution 
function; 𝒩(0,1) represents the standard normal distribution. Typically, 𝑝𝑖 is the p-value 
of an ADF test statistic, but can also be the p-value of other unit root tests. 
 
Figure 13 Sample price series suggesting structural breaks 
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Since some retail price series show signs of structural change (see Figure 14 above), 
structural break unit root test is also performed on individual series. Because ADF test has 
limited power in the presence of structural changes, Zivot and Andrews (1992) proposed 
an ADF type of unit root test for a single structure break. Zivot and Andrews (1992) test is 
not suitable for long horizon time series because the test does not allow for a structural 
break in trend. Due to such shortcoming, Carrion-i-Silvestre, et al. (2009) developed a 
General Least Square (GLS) based structural change unit root test that is capable of 
detecting multiple breakpoints. Harvey, et al. (2013) pointed out that the power of the 
Carrion-i-Silvestre, et al. (2009) test is dependent on the size of a break and proposed the 
HLT method – a GLS-based “detrended” version of ADF test.  
The test statistic of HLT is the minimum ADF t statistic among all possible breakpoint 
locations.  
 𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑚 = min
𝝉∈𝓣
𝐷𝐹𝑐̅
𝐺𝐿𝑆(𝝉) (28) 
 
where 𝑚 denotes the number of breaks; 𝝉 = [𝜏1, 𝜏2, … , 𝜏𝑚]′ denotes a vector of breakpoint 
locations; 𝓣 defines the set of all permissible locations subject to a user defined minimum 
inter-break length; 𝑐̅ is the noncentrality parameter whose value depends on 𝑚; 𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑚 is 
the HLT test statistic of the null hypothesis that structural changes occur at 𝝉 ; and 
𝐷𝐹𝑐̅
𝐺𝐿𝑆(𝝉) is ADF t-statistic of the residual term ?̃?𝑡.  
 ?̃?𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜇 − 𝛽𝑡 − ?̃? 𝐷(𝑡, 𝝉) (29) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 represents the time series data; 𝐷(𝑡, 𝝉) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑡 − 𝝉, 0) is a vector function and 
the max (∙,∙)  function is applied piece-wisely; 𝜇 , 𝛽  and ?̃?  are GLS estimators of ?̂? =
[𝑦1, (1 − 𝜌)𝑦2, (1 − 𝜌)𝑦3, … , (1 − 𝜌)𝑦𝑇]
′  on ?̂? = [𝑥1, (1 − 𝜌)𝑥2, (1 − 𝜌)𝑥3, … , (1 −
𝜌)𝑥𝑇]′ with 𝑥𝑡 = [1, 𝑡, 𝐷(𝑡, 𝝉)]′ and 𝜌 = 1 − 𝑐̅ 𝑇⁄ . Harvey, et al. (2013) provided both the 
value of 𝑐̅ and critical values for 𝑀𝐷𝐹𝑚. 
ADF tests on individual retail price series are first performed. Then ADF t-values are used 
in the panel unit root test proposed by Choi (2001) and Demetrescu, et al. (2006). Panels 
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are organized by MSAs. HTL structural break unit root tests are performed for further 
diagnostics. ADF test on individual price series show that roughly 90% of the series fail to 
reject unit root. The results for the remaining 10% series are assumed to be type II errors. 
All series reject the unit root hypothesis when differenced to the first order. HTL structural 
break tests add four more series as neither I(0) nor I(1). However, the ADF tests on these 
series show they are I(1) under the assumption that there is no structural break. These 
results suggest that all individual series are I(1) processes. The Choi panel unit root test 
shows that two-thirds of panel time series have unit-roots on levels. When differenced, they 
all reject panel unit root hypothesis. Since the estimation of threshold is based on individual 
series rather than panel series, the presence of non-unit root panel series in panel threshold 
error correction model may not present problems.  
3.4.2 Linear Cointegration Analysis 
Engle-Granger and Johansen cointegration tests are performed for each product type. 
Results show only 10% of retail-farm prices are cointegrated when sales prices are 
excluded. When sales prices are not excluded, 15% of the price pairs are cointegrated. 
Given the possibility of structural breaks, I carried out a structural change cointegration 
test based on Gregory and Hansen (1996) and Hatemi-J (2008). The test procedure is 
similar to the unit root version of the test in that all possible breakpoints are evaluated until 
the breakpoint that produces the lowest ADF t-statistic on the residuals of a structural 
change specification is found. The specification of the first stage cointegration test is 
detailed in the next section. Structural cointegration tests show that 6% of all retail-farm 
price pairs are cointegrated with one breakpoint. This number climbs to 44% when two 
breakpoints are assumed. In total, cointegration relationship is confirmed in 49% of retail-
farm price pairs by either the original Engle-Granger test or the structural change 
cointegration test.  
A test proposed by Westerlund (2007) is used to check for panel cointegration effect. 
Though residual based tests like Pedroni (1999) may seem more compatible with the 
threshold estimation procedure described in the next subsection, Westerlund (2007) 
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accounted for cross sectional dependence with bootstrap simulation, and is not susceptible 
to the common factor restriction analyzed by Kremers, et al. (1992). When cross section 
dependence is not accounted for, every panel is cointegrated as whole with the exception 
that only one panel failed to reject no cointegration in the 𝐺𝑎  test. However, the 
corresponding 𝐺𝑡 test is able to reject the no cointegration hypothesis for the same panel. 
Tests on whether at least one series in the panel are not cointegrated are rejected for all 
panels. When cross section dependence is assumed, four panels fail to reject the no 
cointegration hypothesis. All others can reject no cointegration at least at 10% confidence 
level.  
3.4.3 Threshold Cointegration 
Because linear cointegration tests may suffer low power due to misspecification of the data 
generating process (Enders & Siklos, 2001), threshold cointegration is tested for each 
product type along the estimation of threshold values.  
In the presence of structural breaks, the long-run equilibrium equation is specified as: 
 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖
0 + 𝛿𝑖
0𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡>𝜏𝑖
1(𝜇𝑖
1 + 𝛿𝑖
1𝐹𝑖𝑡) + 𝐼𝑡>𝜏𝑖
2(𝜇𝑖
2 + 𝛿𝑖
2𝐹𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (30) 
∀𝑡 ∈ [1, 𝑇] 
 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑖𝑡 are respectively the retail and farm-gate prices for milk type 𝑖 in month 
𝑡 in an MSA; 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the error correction term; 𝜏𝑖
1 and 𝜏𝑖
2 are the breakpoint locations; 𝐼𝐴 
again denotes the indicator function such that 𝐼𝐴 = 1  if 𝐴  is true or = 0  otherwise. 
Equation (30) nests the case of no structural break (when 𝜏𝑖
1 = 𝜏𝑖
2 = 𝑇) and the case of 
one structural break (when 𝜏𝑖
2 = 𝑇 ). The values of 𝜏 ’s are unknown and must be 
estimated. 
To test if 𝑅𝑖𝑡  and 𝐹𝑖,𝑡  are threshold cointegrated, I follow a test procedure proposed by 
Enders and Siklos (2001). The threshold specification of the error-term autoregressive 
model is 
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 Δ𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖
𝐿𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜌𝑖
𝑀𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀 + 𝜌𝑖
𝑈𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑈 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖
𝑗Δ𝑢𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑘𝑖
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (31) 
where  
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝐿 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑢𝑖𝑡≤𝛾𝑖
𝐿  
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑀 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝛾𝑖
𝐿<𝑢𝑖𝑡≤𝛾𝑖
𝑈  
𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑈 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑢𝑖𝑡>𝛾𝑖
𝑈 
𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑀  vanishes when there is only one threshold (𝛾𝑖
𝐿 = 𝛾𝑖
𝑈). This is the case Enders and 
Siklos (2001) examined. To test for cointegration with two thresholds, Loy, et al. (2015) 
exploit a sufficient condition for unit-root threshold autoregressive series found in Chan, 
et al. (1985). Two tests proposed by Enders and Siklos (2001) can be used. First, explosive 
behaviors of the outer regimes need to be ruled out by a “𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥” test. Then a F-test called 
 𝜙-test on unit root can be carried out. Unit root is rejected when either test rejects their 
null hypotheses. The test statistic for the 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥  test is the maximum t-value (𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 ) 
between 𝜌𝑖
𝐿 and 𝜌𝑖
U. The test statistic for the 𝜙-test is the F-statistic for 𝜌𝑖
𝐿 = 𝜌𝑖
𝑀 = 𝜌𝑖
𝑈 =
0. The 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 test tests if the error correction process converges. For a threhold AR(1) 
process, as long as outer regimes are well-behaved, the entire process is ergodic (Chan, et 
al., 1985). When 𝜌𝑖
𝐿 < 0 and 𝜌𝑖
𝑈 < 0, equation (31) does not exhibit explosive behavior. 
Enders and Siklos (2001) found the 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 test powerful enough for checking convergence. 
The 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 is an important first step because the F-test for 𝜌𝑖
𝐿 = 𝜌𝑖
𝑀 = 𝜌𝑖
𝑈 = 0 can be easily 
rejected if one of the outer regime coeffecient is positive. Since the distributions of these 
test statistics are unknown in the presence of nuisance parameters 𝜏𝑖
1 , 𝜏𝑖
2 , 𝛾𝑖
𝐿  and 𝛾𝑖
𝑈 , 
critical values are simulated based on Zivot and Andrews (1992), Gregory and Hansen 
(1996), Enders and Granger (1998), and Enders and Siklos (2001). These values are 
reported in Table 37 and Table 38 on page 115.  
Threshold estimation is based on Chan (1993). Estimation of the structural break location 
parameters 𝜏𝑖
1 and 𝜏𝑖
2 is analogous to Gregory and Hansen (1996). Hansen and Seo (2002) 
proposed a threshold estimation method under VECM framework. The threshold 
optimality condition is the minimized determinant of the correlation matrix of the residuals 
between VECM equations. This condition accounts for cross correlation among VECM 
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equations. However, Serra and Goodwin (2002) found in Monte Carlo experiments that 
cross correlation between VECM equations does not increase accuracy of parameter 
estimates. Hansen and Seo (2002) method also requires a grid search for the cointegration 
coefficients (𝜇𝑖’s and 𝛿𝑖’s) together with threshold parameters (𝛾𝑖’s). Given the complexity 
of equation (30), I maintain the two-step structure of Engle-Granger cointegration test. The 
cointegration coefficients in this study are simplified to be OLS estimates contingent upon 
values of breakpoint parameters 𝜏𝑖
1 and 𝜏𝑖
2. Given a pair of breakpoint parameters and the 
associated error correction terms from equation (30), the optimality condition for 
thresholds is the minimized sum of squared residuals of equation (31). The breakpoint 
estimates are such that they produce the lowest 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 statistic after the optimality condition 
for thresholds is met. 
Detailed steps of the estimation process are provided below: 
Step 1: Pick a pair of feasible values of breakpoint parameters 𝜏𝑖
1 and 𝜏𝑖
2. Let (?̃?𝑖
1, ?̃?𝑖
2) be 
any feasible values for (𝜏𝑖
1, 𝜏𝑖
2). To ensure there are enough observations in each structural 
break period, a minimum of 10% of all observations are required for each period. This 
means, for one-break models, ?̃?𝑖
1 ∈ [0.1𝑇, 0.9𝑇) and ?̃?𝑖
2 = 𝑇; for two-break models, ?̃?𝑖
1 ∈
[0.1𝑇, 0.8𝑇) and ?̃?𝑖
2 ∈ [?̃?𝑖
1 + 0.1𝑇, 0.9𝑇). Estimate equation (30) based on the assumed 
pair (?̃?𝑖
1, ?̃?𝑖
2). Collect residuals {?̃?𝑖𝑡} from equation (30) after excluding the residual in the 
last period ?̃?𝑖𝑇. 
Step 2: Sort {?̃?𝑖𝑡}  ascendingly. Let {?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 }  be the resulting ordered sequence where 𝑗 ∈
[1, 𝑇 − 1]. A minimum of 15% of all observations are assumed in each regime. The pair 
of thresholds (?̃?𝑖
𝐿 , ?̃?𝑖
𝑈)  that minimizes the sum of squared residuals is the appropriate 
estimator for (𝛾𝑖
𝐿 , 𝛾𝑖
𝑈) under the structural breakpoints (?̃?𝑖
1, ?̃?𝑖
2) assumed in step 1. The 
feasible values of (?̃?𝑖
𝐿 , ?̃?𝑖
𝑈)  are as the following. For one-threshold models, ?̃?𝑖
𝐿 ∈
{ũ𝑖𝑡
𝑗 : 𝑗 ∈ [0.15(𝑇 − 1), 0.85(𝑇 − 1))}  and ?̃?𝑖
𝑈 = ?̃?𝑖
𝐿 . For two-thresold models, ?̃?𝑖
𝐿 ∈
{?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 : 𝑗 ∈ [0.15(𝑇 − 1), 0.70(𝑇 − 1))}  and ?̃?𝑖
𝑈 ∈ {?̃?𝑖𝑡
𝑗 : 𝑗 ∈ [𝑗1 + 0.15(𝑇 − 1), 0.85(𝑇 −
1))} where 𝑗1 is such that ?̃?𝑖t
𝑗1 = ?̃?𝑖
𝐿. 
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Step 3: Let (?̃?𝑖
𝐿, ?̃?𝑖
𝑈)  be the threshold estimators under (?̃?𝑖
1, ?̃?𝑖
2) . Calculate the 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 
statistic for equation (31). The pair of breakpoints (?̂?𝑖
1, ?̂?𝑖
2) that minimizes 𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 among all 
(?̃?𝑖
1, ?̃?𝑖
2) is the final estimator for (𝜏𝑖
1, 𝜏𝑖
2) in equation (30). The corresponding threshold 
estimators (𝛾𝑖
𝐿 , 𝛾𝑖
𝑈) ≔ (?̃?𝑖
𝐿, ?̃?𝑖
𝑈) are the final estimators for equation (31). 
The above steps are done for zero to two breakpoints in equation (30). For each number of 
breakpoints, both one-threshold and two-threshold cases are considered. The error 
correction values {?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 } and {?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑈 } for a product type 𝑖 are chosen if unit root is rejected 
under a set of the numbers of breakpoints and thresholds.  
Table 11 below reports threshold cointegration results for all 15 MSAs with TSP excluded. 
The TSP-included results are in Table 36 on page 113. A more detailed version of these 
results can also be found in Table 40 and Table 41. Table 11 shows high degree of non-
linear cointegration relationship between farm gate milk price and retail milk price. As the 
number of breakpoints increases together with the number of thresholds, 97% of all price 
pairs exhibit cointegration relationship in the TSP-excluded dataset. In TSP included case, 
the overall number of cointegrated pairs is close and only increased to 98%. However, 
Houston and San Francisco have the most non-cointegrated pairs in the TSP-excluded 
dataset. When TSP are included, numbers of cointegrated pairs in these two locations are 
increased. However, Houston remains the least cointegrated MSA in both datasets.  
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Table 11 Number of linear or nonlinear cointegrated price pairs in each MSA (TSP 
excluded) 
   Number of Breaks  Number of Thresholds   
MSA Series  0 1 2  0 1 2  Total 
New York 28  46% 79% 93%  61% 96% 96%  100% 
Log Angeles 28  57% 82% 96%  61% 96% 96%  100% 
Chicago 25  64% 88% 96%  48% 96% 96%  100% 
Dallas 26  46% 77% 92%  42% 88% 92%  92% 
Houston 25  52% 64% 76%  48% 84% 88%  88% 
Philadelphia 27  41% 74% 96%  15% 96% 93%  96% 
Miami 22  36% 64% 95%  50% 91% 100%  100% 
Atlanta 26  50% 77% 92%  54% 96% 92%  96% 
Boston 26  58% 88% 100%  62% 96% 100%  100% 
San Francisco 28  29% 61% 86%  39% 82% 86%  89% 
Phoenix 26  81% 81% 92%  54% 100% 100%  100% 
Riverside 28  61% 71% 96%  54% 93% 100%  100% 
Detroit 23  65% 91% 100%  70% 100% 100%  100% 
Seattle 22  73% 68% 91%  36% 86% 100%  100% 
Minneapolis-St Paul 27  63% 93% 93%  37% 100% 100%  100% 
Total 387  55% 77% 93%  49% 94% 96%  97% 
 
Finally, if a farm-retail price pair is threshold cointegrated with more than 1 number of 
thresholds, a sequential test developed by Strikholm & Teräsvirta (2006) is performed to 
determine the optimal number of thresholds. If an error correction process can reject unit 
root when the number of breakpoints is not unique, the higher number of breakpoints is 
favored due to the flexibility breakpoints introduce. 
3.4.4 Panel Estimation and Testing 
To consistently estimate panel time series, Pesaran (2006) developed a Common 
Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG) estimator that allows for heterogenous slope 
coefficients and are consistent when 𝑁 and 𝑇 jointly approach infinity. It also assumes 
cross-sectional dependence through the introduction of unobserved common factors in data 
generating processes. Pesaran (2006) argue that OLS estimators are consistent estimators 
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with the inclusion of cross-sectional averages of the repressors. Chudik and Pesaran (2015) 
extend the CCEMG estimator to panel autoregressive distributed lag models like the one 
specified in equation (24). The consistency of Chudik and Pesaran (2015) estimator is 
obtained when sufficient number of lagged terms are included.  
Equation (24) can be consistently estimated by the following regression model  
 
𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖
𝐿?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑈?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑈 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
+ 𝜅𝐿?̂?𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜅𝑈?̂?𝑡−1
𝑈 + ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 𝛥?̅?𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
 
+𝛼𝑖
10 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
1𝑗𝛥𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
1𝑗𝛥𝐹𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
+ 𝐼𝑡>𝜏𝑖
1 (𝛼𝑖
20 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
2𝑗𝛥𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
2𝑗𝛥𝐹𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
)
+ 𝐼𝑡>𝜏𝑖
2 (𝛼𝑖
30 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
3𝑗𝛥𝑅𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖
3𝑗𝛥𝐹𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑞𝑖
𝑗=0
) 
(32) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿  and ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑈  are estimated threshold error correction terms from equation (30), 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is 
the error term. Terms in the second line of equation (31) are required terms to consistently 
estimate CCEMG estimator. Particularly, ?̂?𝑡
𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑁
𝑖=1 , ?̂?𝑡
𝑈 =
1
𝑛
∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑈𝑁
𝑖=1 ; 𝛥?̅?𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 . The remaining terms in equation (31) control for autocorrelation in the 
presence of breakpoints from the first-stage cointegration estimation. 𝜏𝑖
1  is the first 
breakpoint for product 𝑖. 𝜏𝑖
2 is the second. Note that there is no cross-sectional average 
term of the differenced Class I price in equation (31). This is because within each region, 
the farm price is the same for all price pairs in the panel. Adding cross-sectional average is 
equivalent to adding the 𝛥𝐹𝑖,𝑡 term twice. Equation (31) is estimated separately for each 𝑖. 
The lag length 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑞𝑖 are determined by Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  
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Note that 𝜅𝐿 and 𝜅𝑈 are not CCEMG estimators for 𝜃𝑖
𝐿 and 𝜃𝑖
𝑈. Their sole purpose in the 
equation is to control for cross sectional correlation. The CCEMG estimators of interest 
are 𝜃𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑁
𝑖=1  and 𝜃
𝑈 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑈𝑁
𝑖=1  where 𝜃𝑖
𝐿  and 𝜃𝑖
𝑈  are OLS estimators of 𝜃𝑖
𝐿  and 
𝜃𝑖
𝑈. The null hypothesis of the panel symmetry test specified in equation (26) is equivalent 
to 𝜃𝐿 = 𝜃𝑈. This test can be further transformed into a significance test. Equation (32) is 
thus reformulated as below:  
 
𝛥𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑖
𝐿𝑈?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐿𝑈 + 𝜃𝑖
𝑈?̂?𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑈 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
+ 𝜅𝐿?̂?𝑡−1
𝐿 + 𝜅𝑈?̂?𝑡−1
𝑈 + ∑ 𝜅𝑖,𝑗
𝑅 𝛥?̅?𝑡−𝑗
𝑝𝑖
𝑗=1
 
+ ⋯ 
(33) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿𝑈 = ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝐿 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑈 . The terms represented by “…” in equation (33) are the ones from 
the third line onwards in equation (32). Product type specific asymmetry test specified in 
equation (25) can be easily carried out through a t-test on 𝜃𝑖
𝑈 = 0. Panel asymmetry from 
equation (26) is tested through the CCEMG estimator ?̅?𝑈 =
1
𝑁
∑ ?̃?𝑖
𝑈𝑁
𝑖=1  with ?̃?𝑖
𝑈 being OLS 
estimator for 𝜃𝑖
𝑈 in equation (33). To test ?̅?𝑈 = 0, let 𝑧𝑈 be the test statistic defined as 
𝑧𝑈 = ?̅?
𝑈
√
𝑁(𝑁 − 1)
∑ (𝜃𝑖
𝑈 − ?̅?𝑈)
2𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Chudik and Pesaran (2015) proved that 𝑧𝑈~𝒩(0,1). Test results are discussed in the next 
section.  
3.5 Results and Discussion 
Results for symmetric price transmission tests specified in equations (25) and (26) with 
TSP excluded are summarized in Table 12 below. The second and third columns in Table 
12 show CCEMG estimates for the lower and upper regime error correction terms. The 
fourth column displays the number of series within each MSA that reject symmetry. The 
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last column reports CCEMG estimate of ?̅?𝑈. A rejection of the panel symmetry test is 
equivalent to a rejection of ?̅?𝑈 = 0.  
The second and third columns of Table 12 show that at least one of the two CCEMG 
estimates of the error correction regimes is significant at 10% level for all but one MSA. It 
suggests that there is error correction effect in these regions. Houston however does not 
exhibit any error correction effect. This is not surprising given that Houston has least 
amount of price pairs that are cointegrated (see Table 10 and Table 11). Just because the 
CCEMG regime estimates are significant does not guarantee there is threshold error 
correction effect.  
In general, the number of series within each MSA that display threshold effect serves as an 
indicator to whether the panel itself may contain threshold effect. The fourth column of 
Table 12 shows that the region with both significant regime CCEMG estimators usually 
has a high rejection rate in individual symmetry tests. For example, only 36% of the price 
pairs in Seattle suggest the existence of threshold effect. Although Seattle’s upper regime 
CCEMG estimate is significant, the lower regime panel estimator is not. Similar pattern 
can be observed for New York, Los Angeles and Houston.  
Interestingly, these four regions also fail to reject the panel symmetry test. The last column 
in Table 12 suggests that 5 of the 15 regions studied here may not feature asymmetric 
transmission at all. Though the number of series in Phoenix that rejects individual 
symmetry test is relatively high, the insignificant upper regime CCEMG estimate may 
suggests that the error correction effect, however present, does not show strong signs of 
panel threshold effect on price transmission. Similar argument can be made for New York, 
Los Angeles and Seattle.  
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Table 12 Symmetric transmission test results with TSP excluded 
     
Region CCEMG  
Lower 
Regime 
(𝜃𝐿) 
CCEMG  
Upper Regime 
(𝜃𝑈) 
% of Series 
that Reject 
Individual 
Symmetry Test 
Null: Eq (11) 
Panel 
Symmetry Test 
(?̅?𝑈) 
Null: Eq (12) 
     
New York -0.272 *** 
(0.051) 
-0.081  
(0.102) 
46% -0.191  
(0.124) 
Log Angeles -0.517 ** 
(0.203) 
-0.064  
(0.223) 
68% -0.453  
(0.590) 
Chicago -0.582 *** 
(0.183) 
-0.395 * 
(0.239) 
88% -0.187 * 
(0.100) 
Dallas -0.530 * 
(0.276) 
-0.074 * 
(0.042) 
81% 0.456 ** 
(0.229) 
Houston -0.079  
(0.275) 
-0.083  
(0.245) 
68% 0.004  
(0.015) 
Philadelphia -0.620 *** 
(0.189) 
-0.223 *** 
(0.067) 
70% -0.037 *** 
(0.014) 
Miami -1.754 *** 
(0.488) 
-0.065 * 
(0.037) 
77% 0.622 ** 
(0.277) 
Atlanta -0.501 * 
(0.268) 
-0.268 ** 
(0.121) 
92% 0.233 * 
(0.127) 
Boston -0.673 *** 
(0.248) 
-0.221 * 
(0.126) 
77% 0.674 ** 
(0.301) 
San Francisco -0.442 *** 
(0.152) 
-0.274 ** 
(0.120) 
82% -0.168 * 
(0.089) 
Phoenix -0.718 *** 
(0.212) 
-0.347  
(0.323) 
88% -0.371  
(0.563) 
Riverside -0.394 * 
(0.240) 
-0.115 * 
(0.062) 
96% 0.280 * 
(0.146) 
Detroit 0.048 * 
(0.027) 
-1.032 * 
(0.565) 
87% 1.080 ** 
(0.532) 
Seattle -0.523  
(3.060) 
-0.190 ** 
(0.086) 
36% -0.333  
(0.365) 
Minneapolis-St 
Paul 
-0.409 *** 
(0.148) 
-0.196 * 
(0.108) 
85% -0.213 ** 
(0.102) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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In terms of the speed of asymmetric transmission itself, results from Table 12 are consistent 
with asymmetry literature. The CCEMG lower regime estimate is larger than the upper 
regime estimate in absolute value in all but one region where asymmetry is significant. A 
direct translation of this observation is that adjustment to negative retail margin shocks is 
faster than reaction to positive margin shocks. This means retail price reacts faster to farm-
gate price increases than to decreases.  
Symmetry test results for the TSP-included case is presented in Table 39 on page 116. The 
narrative presented so far in this section still holds for the TSP-included case. The number 
of series that reject the individual symmetry test is still a good indicator of the panel test 
result. In addition, the majority of the regions show significant error correction effect. Four 
of them, however, do not exhibit strong threshold effect. With this dataset, positive 
asymmetry is still the kind that shows up among regions tested with asymmetric price 
transmission. The speed itself appears to be sensitive to the presence of TSP. CCEMG 
coefficients do not seem to stay in a narrow range between Table 12 and Table 39. Finally, 
it is worth noting, besides the fact that one more region is able to reject panel symmetry 
compared to the TSP-excluded case, the percentage of individual series that reject 
symmetry is higher in almost all regions. This result is consistent with Tifaoui and Cramon-
Taubadel (2016) in that TSP seems to exaggerate asymmetric price transmission.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This study investigates asymmetric price transmission between retail milk price and farm-
gate price in 15 U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). Retail prices come from 
Nielsen Retail Scanner dataset. Farm-gate price is the regional Federal Milk Marketing 
Order or California Class I milk price. Due to the sheer size of the Nielsen dataset, retail 
prices are aggregated to product type and MSA level. The determination of a product type 
is assisted by the Random Forest data mining technique.  
A two-threshold three-regime error correction model is first estimated for each retail-farm 
price pair. Due to the presence of structural break in price series, special tests on unit root 
and cointegration relation are performed before the estimation of error correction 
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thresholds. Common Correlated Effect Group Mean panel estimates on the error correction 
terms are then estimated to study the panel effect on each MSA.  
Panel data and individual-series level asymmetry tests suggest evidence to support 
asymmetric price transmission in two third of the regions. There is strong evidence to rule 
out asymmetry in New York, Los Angeles and Seattle. The entire analysis is performed 
twice with temporary sales prices excluded in the first time and included in the second 
time. Results from the two analyses suggest that though temporary sales price does not 
change the existence of asymmetry, it intensifies the speed of asymmetry. The 
intensification effect is consistent with Tifaoui & von Cramon-Taubadel (2016) in that 
temporary sales price exaggerates price asymmetry if not properly identified and excluded 
from analysis.  
This study faces several limitations. First, panel series are given equal weights in CCEMG 
estimator. Certain product types are sold in higher volumes than others. To better model 
asymmetry in a geographic region, sales weighted CCEMG may be more appropriate. 
However, the potential correlation between sales volume and asymmetry may complicate 
the underlying data generating assumptions in CCEMG framework. Second, this study 
only utilizes data period from 2006 to 2014. Towards the middle of this period is 2009 
when the dairy industry suffered historical margin decline. This rare margin scenario may 
take error correction terms more than 5 years (2010-2014) to recover to a true long-term 
equilibrium. If more data were available, structural breaks may not be needed in the first 
stage Engle-Granger procedure. This can greatly simplify the threshold model estimation 
which is intrinsically a time-consuming process.  
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Appendix A: Data generating process of the futures 
Let 𝑓𝑡,𝑇 denote the realized price at time 𝑡 of the futures contract that expires at 𝑇. Let 
random variable 𝐹𝑡,𝑇  represent all possible terminal prices that matures at 𝑇  with 
information available at time 𝑡. Naturally we let 𝐹𝑇,𝑇 = 𝑓𝑇,𝑇 be deterministic.  
The change of a commodity futures price conditioned at time 𝑡  is assumed to follow 
geometric Brownian motion expressed by the following Wiener process (Black, 1976): 
𝑑(𝐹𝑡,𝑇) = 𝜎 ∙ 𝐹𝑡,𝑇 ∙ 𝑑WT 
where 𝑊𝑇~𝑁(0, √𝑇) is a Wiener process; 𝜎  is the volatility of the futures price. The 
solution of this stochastic differential equation is 
ln (𝐹𝑡,𝑇) = ln (𝑓𝑡,𝑇) −
1
2
σ2(T − 𝑡) + σ√𝑇 − 𝑡𝑍11 
where 𝑍~𝑁(0,1) is a standard normal random variable. This says the price at time 𝑡 of the 
contract that expires at 𝑇 follows a log-normal marginal distribution  
ln (𝐹𝑡,𝑇)~𝑁 (ln (𝑓𝑡,𝑇) −
1
2
σ2(T − 𝑡), 𝜎2(𝑇 − 𝑡)). 
The volatility of a futures contract (𝜎) is estimated as the average of the implied volatilities 
from near-the-money call and put options. Bisection root-finding method is used to invert 
the trinomial tree option pricing model (Boyle, 1986) to get implied volatilities. Since 
prices of the contracts that expire in more than a year are needed, proper data imputation 
strategy is required to deal with the illiquidity of the deferred soybean meal and Class IV 
option contracts. For deferred soybean meal options that were not traded on a particular 
day, the implied volatility of the contract that expires the closest to the deferred contract is 
used as the imputed value. This can be justified for deeply deferred contracts are usually 
                                                 
11 For an exposure to how this stochastic differential equation is solved, see Hull, J.C. 2009. Options, 
Futures, and other derivatives: Prentice-Hall Inc.(Hull, 2009). 
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priced based on long-term average. For Class IV options whose price cannot be found on 
a particular day, if they expire before the first 3 months in the coverage year, implied 
volatility of the Class III option with the same expiration is used as imputed value; if they 
expire after the first 3 months in the coverage year, the imputation rule for soybean meal 
applies.  
To put together a multivariate normal distribution with marginal distributions, a correlation 
matrix 𝑹 for all possible pairs of random variables has to be determined. Define realized 
price shock 𝜂𝜏
𝑇 = 𝑓𝑇,𝑇 − 𝑓𝑡,𝑇. Let {?̂?𝑖} be a sequence of months in which Class III or Class 
IV contracts expire. For grain futures, 𝑓𝑡,𝑇 and 𝑓𝑇,𝑇 are weighted prices following Table 3. 
Let {𝜏𝑗} be a sequence of 96 𝜏’s. These 96 𝜏’s can be further divided into 4 groups with 24 
𝜏’s in each group. These four groups represent four futures commodities: Class III milk, 
Class IV milk, corn and soybean meals. Within each group, 𝜏 sequentially ranges from one 
month to 24 months. The (𝑗, 𝑘) element in the correlation matrix equals the correlation 
between sequence {𝜂𝜏𝑗
?̂?𝑖} and {𝜂𝜏𝑘
?̂?𝑖 }. This correlation is regarded as the correlation between 
(𝐹𝑇1−𝜏𝑗,𝑇1 − 𝐸𝑇1−𝜏𝑗[𝐹𝑇1,𝑇1]) and (𝐹𝑇2−𝜏𝑘,𝑇2 − 𝐸𝑇2−𝜏𝑘[𝐹𝑇2,𝑇2])
12 for any contract expiration 
months 𝑇1  and 𝑇2 . Since expectations are deterministic, it can be interpreted as the 
correlation between random variables 𝐹𝑇1−𝜏𝑗,𝑇1  and 𝐹𝑇2−𝜏𝑘,𝑇2 . In practice, the actual 
correlation matrix 𝑹 is determined by removing the columns and rows from the 96x96 
matrix and only leaving the ones that are relevant to a particular simulation.  
Because Class IV futures market was very illiquid before 2007, not all 24 contracts of Class 
IV futures are traded on a particular day. Contracts that expire in 1 to 4 months are more 
frequently traded than those deeply deferred contracts. As a matter of fact, 61 out of 127 
months sampled to construct the correlation matrix contain at least one missing price for 
Class IV. A simple solution of excluding data before 2007 causes the correlation 
coefficients between any two of the rest three commodities unrealistically high due to the 
2008 financial crisis and its ripple effect over a few years after. Omitting only Class IV 
                                                 
12 If we believe futures price is a Martingale process, 𝐸𝑡[𝐹𝑡,𝑇] = 𝑓𝑡,𝑇. 
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data before 2007 while keeping the rest of the commodities over a longer period renders 
the correlation matrix not positive definite13. In a belief that deferred contracts are priced 
based on long term trend, missing prices on the same day are linearly extrapolated through 
an OLS regression model on the available data of the term structure14. The extrapolation 
method does not apply to observations that only contain no more than 4 available prices 
because of the information scarcity of the term structure those observations provide. This 
leads to the exclusion of 10 observations from the dataset that generates the correlation 
matrix.  
The Spearman’s rho is defined as the Pearson correlation coefficient of the ranked 
variables. For a sample set 𝚮, let ℎ𝑡
𝑖  denotes the 𝑡th observation of the 𝑖th variable. The 
ranked value of the sample observation ℎ𝑡
𝑖  is defined as 
𝑟𝑡
𝑖 = ∑ 𝟏ℎ𝑡𝑖 ≤𝑠
𝑠∈𝚮i
 
where 𝚮i  is the subset of 𝚮 with all sample values of the 𝑖 th variable in it; 𝟏𝐴  is the 
indicator function that takes the value of 1 if condition 𝐴 is satisfied or takes 0 otherwise. 
Since the Spearman’s rho only depends on the ordinal order of the observations in a sample 
set, any monotonically increasing transformation preserves Spearman’s rho. This 
interesting property of Spearman’s rho is crucial to preserve dependence structure among 
all contracts.  
Finally, the data generating process can be described as the following (Press, et al., 2007): 
Let 𝑿 = (𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑖, … , 𝑋𝑀)
′  be a vector of standard-normally distributed random 
variables. Use Cholesky decomposition to factor Spearman’s rho correlation matrix 𝑹 into 
the lower triangular matrix 𝑳 post multiplied by its transpose 𝑳′: 
                                                 
13 The data generating process performs Cholesky decomposition of the correlation matrix. The Cholesky 
decomposition requires the correlation matrix to be positive definite.  
14 A term structure of a commodity is the prices of a continuous range of contract months observed on a 
same day. The range usually goes from the first contract that expires after the observe day to as far as the 
research needs or the market trades.  
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𝑹 = 𝑳×𝑳′. 
Then 𝒁 = (𝑍1, … , 𝑍𝑖 , … , 𝑍𝑀)
′ = 𝑳𝑿~𝑁(𝟎, 𝑹)  follows multivariate normal distribution 
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix 𝑹. Thus the terminal prices of Class III 
milk, Class IV milk, corn and soybean meal follow multivariate log-normal distribution 
ln 𝑁 (𝝁, 𝚺𝑹𝚺′): 
𝒀 = 𝚺𝑳𝑿 + 𝝁 
where 𝒀 = (𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑡,𝑇1), … , 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑡,𝑇𝑖), … , 𝑙𝑛(𝐹𝑡,𝑇𝑀))
′
 is an 𝑀×1 column vector of log-prices; 
𝚺 is a diagonal matrix with the 𝑖th diagonal entry equal to the time scaled implied volatility 
𝜎𝑖√𝑇𝑖 − 𝑡  for the 𝑖 th contract; and 𝝁  is a column vector of means with (ln(𝑓𝑡,𝑇𝑖) −
1
2
σ2(𝑇𝑖 − 𝑡)) as the 𝑖th element.  
It is worth noting that the correlation coefficient matrix 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟[𝒀] = 𝑹, because any (𝑙, 𝑘) 
entry in the variance-covariance matrix 𝚺𝑹𝚺′  is equal to the product of the standard 
deviation of each variable multiplied by the (𝑙, 𝑘) entry of the 𝑹 matrix. Furthermore let 
𝑭𝑡,𝑻 = (𝐹𝑡,𝑇1 , … , 𝐹𝑡,𝑇𝑖 , … 𝐹𝑡,𝑇𝑀)
′
 be a column vector of prices at time 𝑡 obtained by taking 
the exponential function on 𝒀 element by element. Because the exponential function is 
monotonically increasing, 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟[𝑭𝑡,𝑻] = 𝑹. Thus the dependence structure is preserved.  
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Appendix B: Additional tables and figures 
Table 13 Monthly seasonality production weight 
Month Upper Midwest Lower Midwest 
January 8.4% 8.3% 
February 7.7% 7.6% 
March 8.5% 8.5% 
April 8.4% 8.3% 
May 8.7% 8.7% 
June 8.4% 8.4% 
July 8.5% 8.5% 
August 8.5% 8.5% 
September 8.1% 8.1% 
October 8.3% 8.4% 
November 8.0% 8.2% 
December 8.4% 8.5% 
 
Table 14 Regional mailbox price models 
 
Upper Midwest Mailbox 
Milk Price 
Lower  Midwest Mailbox 
Milk Price 
Intercept 
1.4835*** 
(0.2068) 
1.075*** 
(0.3087) 
Announced Class III 
0.6905*** 
(0.0306) 
0.5842*** 
(0.0457) 
Announced Class IV 
0.3153*** 
(0.0294) 
0.4284*** 
(0.0439) 
Number of observations 167 167 
90 
R2 0.9722 0.9409 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 15 National basis models 
 All milk pricet NASS Cornt NASS Soybean mealt NASS Hayt 
     
Intercept   1.8548*** 
(0.0925) 
0.0490  
(0.0622) 
-3.6946 
(3.4031) 
4.3358*** 
(1.6553) 
     
Class IIIt  0.4235
*** 
(0.0147) 
   
     
Class IVt  0.2723
*** 
(0.0126) 
   
     
Max(Class IIIt-1, Class IVt-1) 0.2889
*** 
(0.0169) 
   
     
CME Cornt   
0.9250*** 
(0.0120) 
 
3.5193*** 
(0.5409) 
     
CME Soybean Mealt    
1.0203*** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0184** 
(0.0081) 
     
Nass Hayt-1     
0.8935*** 
(0.0213) 
     
1st Quarter Dummy -0.0405 
(0.0527) 
0.0200  
(0.0619) 
1.2473 
(2.9443) 
3.1078*** 
(1.1360) 
     
2nd Quarter Dummy -0.4459*** 
(0.0535) 
0.0442 
(0.0623) 
-2.3605 
(2.9626) 
2.8151** 
(1.1277) 
     
3rd Quarter Dummy -0.4815*** 
(0.0530) 
0.0191 
(0.0622) 
1.7367 
(2.9676) 
1.4895 
(1.1250) 
     
Number of observations 169 170 170 169 
     
R2 0.9950 0.9731 0.9840 0.9852 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 16 Regional basis models 
 
Upper Midwest 
Mailbox 
Lower Midwest 
Mailbox 
Upper Midwest 
NASS Corn 
Lower Midwest 
NASS Corn 
Upper Midwest 
NASS Hay 
Lower Midwest 
NASS Hay 
Intercept 
1.8958*** 
(0.1856) 
1.7506*** 
(0.2999) 
-0.0138 
(0.063) 
0.066 
(0.0604) 
5.0392*** 
(1.4974) 
3.0909*** 
(1.18) 
Announced Class III 
0.6775*** 
(0.0248) 
0.5575*** 
(0.0401) 
    
Announced Class 
IV 
0.3329*** 
(0.0237) 
0.4541*** 
(0.0383) 
    
Weighted CME 
Corn 
  
0.9257*** 
(0.0122) 
0.9427*** 
(0.0117) 
1.6983*** 
(0.4009) 
2.7783*** 
(0.3552) 
Weighted CME 
Soybean Meal 
    
-0.0014 
(0.0089) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.006) 
Lag Hay     
0.9281*** 
(0.0228) 
0.9368*** 
(0.0145) 
1st Quarter Dummy 
-0.1819 
(0.1134) 
-0.4494** 
(0.1832) 
0.028 
(0.061) 
-0.0019 
(0.0584) 
-2.704** 
(1.1281) 
-1.7074* 
(0.919) 
2nd Quarter Dummy 
-0.8628*** 
(0.1124) 
-1.3392*** 
(0.1815) 
0.0807 
(0.061) 
0.0468 
(0.0585) 
-3.6241*** 
(1.1352) 
-0.719 
(0.9308) 
3rd Quarter Dummy 
-0.8524*** 
(0.1121) 
-0.8022*** 
(0.1811) 
0.0836 
(0.061) 
0.0085 
(0.0585) 
-3.6365*** 
(1.1629) 
0.7105 
(0.9306) 
# of obs 167 167 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.982538433 0.95662701 0.972791699 0.975781861 0.9815 0.9912 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 17 Regional hay models 
 Upper Midwest  
Hay Basis Model 
Lower Midwest 
Hay Basis Model 
Upper Midwest  
Hay Cross-hedge Model 
Lower Midwest 
Hay Cross-hedge Model 
Intercept 
5.0392*** 
(1.4974) 
3.0909*** 
(1.18) 
29.9032 
(0.7696) 
31.0558 
(0.7566) 
Weighted CME Corn 
1.6983*** 
(0.4009) 
2.7783*** 
(0.3552) 
5.258 
(1.3613) 
12.7958 
(1.6528) 
Weighted CME 
Soybean Meal 
-0.0014 
(0.0089) 
-0.0177*** 
(0.006) 
0.2285 
(0.0225) 
0.1611 
(0.0274) 
Lag Hay 
0.9281*** 
(0.0228) 
0.9368*** 
(0.0145) 
  
1st Quarter Dummy 
-2.704** 
(1.1281) 
-1.7074* 
(0.919) 
  
2nd Quarter Dummy 
-3.6241*** 
(1.1352) 
-0.719 
(0.9308) 
  
3rd Quarter Dummy 
-3.6365*** 
(1.1629) 
0.7105 
(0.9306) 
  
# of obs 167 167 167 167 
R2 0.9815 0.9912 0.7696 0.7566 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Hay basis models convert futures prices to local hay prices for the calculation of feed cost. The cross-hedge models determine the 
hedging P&L for the hay hedge.  
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Table 18 Values of key simulation variables 
    4 million Production History1  6 million Production History1  60 million Production History1 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign 
up 
Quote 
Date 
ADPM CL2  Premium Indemnity CL2  Premium Indemnity CL2  Premium Indemnity 
2008 Oct 10/1/2007 10.30 4.0 0.000 0.0002 4.0 0.000 0.0002 4.0 0.000 0.0002 
2008 Jan 1/2/2008 9.69 4.0 0.000 0.0004 4.0 0.000 0.0004 4.0 0.000 0.0004 
2009 Oct 10/1/2008 7.71 8.0 0.475 0.8961 8.0 0.704 0.8961 6.0 0.148 0.2096 
2009 Apr 4/2/2008 8.84 7.5 0.300 0.5583 6.5 0.142 0.3308 6.0 0.148 0.2507 
2009 Jan 1/2/2009 5.62 8.0 0.475 2.3003 8.0 0.704 2.3003 8.0 1.294 2.3003 
2010 Oct 10/1/2009 8.60 4.0 0.000 0.0012 4.0 0.000 0.0012 4.0 0.000 0.0012 
2010 Jan 12/31/2009 8.56 4.0 0.000 0.0023 4.0 0.000 0.0023 4.0 0.000 0.0023 
2010 Apr 4/1/2009 8.94 7.5 0.300 0.4352 6.5 0.142 0.2315 5.0 0.039 0.0817 
2011 Jan 12/31/2010 5.88 8.0 0.475 2.0392 8.0 0.704 2.0392 8.0 1.294 2.0392 
2011 Apr 4/1/2010 8.57 6.5 0.090 0.1059 4.0 0.000 0.0059 4.0 0.000 0.0059 
2011 Oct 9/30/2010 6.72 8.0 0.475 1.3428 8.0 0.704 1.3428 6.5 0.275 0.4996 
2012 Apr 4/1/2011 5.81 8.0 0.475 2.2879 8.0 0.704 2.2879 8.0 1.294 2.2879 
2012 Oct 9/30/2011 7.61 8.0 0.475 0.9537 8.0 0.704 0.9537 6.5 0.275 0.3568 
2012 Jan 1/3/2012 7.31 8.0 0.475 0.9829 8.0 0.704 0.9829 6.0 0.148 0.2201 
All numeric values except dates and years are in $/cwt. 
See next page for more rows. 
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Values of key simulation variables continued 
    4 million Production History1  6 million Production History1  60 million Production History1 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign 
up 
Quote 
Date 
ADPM CL2  Premium Indemnity CL2  Premium Indemnity CL2  Premium Indemnity 
2013 Oct 10/1/2012 6.85 8.0 0.475 1.4191 8.0 0.704 1.4191 6.5 0.275 0.6470 
2013 Apr 4/2/2012 6.90 8.0 0.475 1.3855 8.0 0.704 1.3855 6.5 0.275 0.6225 
2013 Jan 1/2/2013 7.39 8.0 0.475 0.9603 8.0 0.704 0.9603 4.0 0.000 0.0103 
2014 Oct 10/1/2013 9.27 4.0 0.000 0.0003 4.0 0.000 0.0003 4.0 0.000 0.0003 
2014 Jan 12/31/2013 11.00 4.0 0.000 0.0000 4.0 0.000 0.0000 4.0 0.000 0.0000 
2014 Apr 4/1/2013 7.57 8.0 0.475 0.9035 8.0 0.704 0.9035 6.0 0.148 0.2164 
All numeric values except dates and years are in $/cwt. 
 
1: Production history in lbs. 2: CL stands for coverage level.
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Table 19 Average simulated net cash sales on $/cwt 
   Upper Midwest Lower Midwest 
Coverage 
Year Sign up Quote Date 
Feed  
Grower 
Feed 
Purchaser 
Feed  
Grower 
Feed 
Purchaser 
2008 Oct 10/1/2007 17.82 9.88 17.94 10.24 
2008 Jan 1/2/2008 18.44 9.31 18.78 9.86 
2009 Oct 10/1/2008 16.97 7.23 17.39 8.05 
2009 Apr 4/2/2008 18.84 8.11 19.22 9.02 
2009 Jan 1/2/2009 13.77 5.21 14.08 5.75 
2010 Oct 10/1/2009 15.41 8.11 15.92 8.70 
2010 Jan 12/31/2009 16.45 8.24 16.80 8.72 
2010 Apr 4/1/2009 16.76 8.21 17.09 8.91 
2011 Jan 12/31/2010 16.52 5.59 16.73 6.16 
2011 Apr 4/1/2010 15.73 7.99 16.16 8.65 
2011 Oct 9/30/2010 15.67 6.30 15.97 6.90 
2012 Apr 4/1/2011 16.61 5.00 17.06 6.02 
2012 Oct 9/30/2011 18.18 6.93 18.42 8.01 
2012 Jan 1/3/2012 18.46 6.65 18.79 7.97 
2013 Oct 10/1/2012 19.50 5.90 19.92 6.95 
2013 Apr 4/2/2012 16.97 5.99 17.38 7.08 
2013 Jan 1/2/2013 19.54 6.77 19.87 7.59 
2014 Oct 10/1/2013 18.48 8.56 18.68 9.09 
2014 Jan 12/31/2013 20.11 10.48 20.18 10.73 
2014 Apr 4/1/2013 17.59 6.61 18.00 7.49 
Net cash sales = Milk revenue – Feed cost. Feed growers assume zero feed cost.  
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Table 20 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed growers with 4-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 15.25% 15.00% 1.64% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct N/A N/A  
2012 2012 Jan 59.58% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 66.68% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2013 Jan 57.35% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 57.18% 57.13% 0.10% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 21 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed purchasers with 4-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 23.81% 0.00% 100.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 44.73% 0.00% 100.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 27.54% 0.00% 100.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 26.19% 9.80% 62.57% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 71.46% 0.00% 100.00% 
2012 2012 Jan 67.03% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 22 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed growers with 4-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 32.91% 32.72% 0.58% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 81.17% 49.17% 39.42% 
2012 2012 Jan 45.63% N/A  
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 95.41% 0.84% 99.12% 
2013 2013 Jan 82.99% 18.88% 77.25% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 67.75% 67.71% 0.05% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007. 
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Table 23 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed purchasers with 4-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 53.85% 5.47% 89.84% 
2009 2008 Oct 81.04% 0.55% 99.32% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 46.91% 7.93% 83.10% 
2010 2009 Oct 10.29% 9.83% 4.47% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 38.35% 21.82% 43.10% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 66.56% 0.00% 100.00% 
2012 2012 Jan 77.16% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 20.41% 20.31% 0.47% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 24 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed growers with 6-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 5.49% 5.20% 5.20% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct N/A N/A  
2012 2012 Jan 46.56% 4.56% 90.20% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 55.39% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2013 Jan 41.24% 0.00% 100.00% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 42.17% 42.08% 0.20% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 25 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed purchasers with 6-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 23.81% 0.00% 100.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 44.73% 0.00% 100.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 27.54% 2.08% 92.46% 
2010 2009 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 26.19% 24.45% 6.66% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 71.46% 0.44% 99.38% 
2012 2012 Jan 67.03% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 26 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed growers with 6-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 11.65% 11.44% 1.79% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 57.61% 34.44% 40.23% 
2012 2012 Jan 16.63% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 70.39% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2013 Jan 47.39% 1.96% 95.86% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 37.53% 37.47% 0.14% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007. 
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Table 27 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed purchasers with 6-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 53.85% 20.15% 62.58% 
2009 2008 Oct 81.04% 15.17% 81.28% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 46.91% 21.63% 53.89% 
2010 2009 Oct 10.29% 9.83% 4.47% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 38.35% 36.70% 4.32% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 66.56% 0.00% 100.00% 
2012 2012 Jan 77.16% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 20.41% 20.31% 0.47% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 28 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed growers with 60-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 77.78% 86.47% -11.18% 
2012 2012 Jan 33.67% 18.85% 44.02% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 44.09% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2013 Jan 25.23% 23.07% 8.58% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 27.17% 27.10% 0.26% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 29 Crowding-out effect on upper Midwest feed purchasers with 60-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 23.81% 0.00% 100.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 44.73% 19.36% 56.71% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 27.54% 15.74% 42.84% 
2010 2009 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 26.19% 24.45% 6.66% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 71.46% 40.75% 42.97% 
2012 2012 Jan 67.03% 39.52% 41.04% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 30 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed growers with 60-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign-Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2010 2009 Oct 11.65% 11.44% 1.79% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr N/A N/A  
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 57.61% 49.40% 14.25% 
2012 2012 Jan 16.63% 0.00% 100.00% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct 70.39% 37.21% 47.14% 
2013 2013 Jan 47.39% 45.46% 4.08% 
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 37.53% 37.47% 0.14% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007. 
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Table 31 Crowding-out effect on lower Midwest feed purchasers with 60-million-pound 
production history 
Coverage 
Year 
Sign Up 
Month 
Non-
participant 
Participant % change 
2008 2007 Oct 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2008 2008 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2009 2008 Apr 53.45% 28.21% 47.23% 
2009 2008 Oct 80.90% 64.91% 19.76% 
2009 2009 Jan N/A N/A  
2010 2009 Apr 46.87% 35.38% 24.52% 
2010 2009 Oct 10.08% 9.69% 3.88% 
2010 2009 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2011 2010 Apr 37.51% 35.83% 4.49% 
2011 2010 Oct N/A N/A  
2011 2011 Jan N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Apr N/A N/A  
2012 2011 Oct 66.12% 31.95% 51.67% 
2012 2012 Jan 76.45% 53.46% 30.07% 
2013 2012 Apr N/A N/A  
2013 2012 Oct N/A N/A  
2013 2013 Jan N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Apr N/A N/A  
2014 2013 Oct 19.83% 19.72% 0.56% 
2014 2014 Jan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Class IV contracts are not available in April 2007.  
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Table 32 MPP-DL tier 1 premium rates in $/cwt 
  Payment Cap  
  $1.00/cwt $1.50/cwt $2.00/cwt $2.50/cwt $3.00/cwt $3.50/cwt $4.00/cwt $4.50/cwt $5.00/cwt  
C
o
v
er
ag
e 
L
ev
el
 (
$
/c
w
t)
 
$4.00 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015  
$4.50 0.013 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.023  
$5.00 0.021 0.026 0.030 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.036  
$5.50 0.049 0.062 0.047 0.050 0.051 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.055  
$6.00 0.070 0.090 0.104 0.113 0.119 0.124 0.128 0.130 0.131  
$6.50 0.100 0.129 0.149 0.162 0.170 0.178 0.183 0.186 0.188  
$7.00 0.140 0.181 0.210 0.230 0.240 0.253 0.260 0.264 0.267  
$7.50 0.192 0.251 0.292 0.321 0.334 0.354 0.364 0.370 0.375  
$8.00 0.221 0.288 0.398 0.439 0.457 0.488 0.501 0.511 0.517  
$8.50 0.292 0.386 0.453 0.499 0.510 0.550 0.563 0.571 0.577  
$9.00 0.371 0.497 0.591 0.658 0.673 0.736 0.756 0.769 0.777  
$9.50 0.408 0.616 0.743 0.836 0.855 0.950 0.981 1.001 1.014  
$10.00 0.486 0.670 0.899 1.025 1.047 1.186 1.233 1.263 1.284  
$10.50 0.512 0.789 0.973 1.118 1.241 1.440 1.507 1.553 1.584  
$11.00 0.601 0.836 1.032 1.316 1.287 1.703 1.797 1.864 1.910  
$11.50  0.689 0.967 1.202 1.398 1.982 1.843 2.095 2.189 2.256  
$12.00 0.768 1.091 1.369 1.603 1.434 2.110 2.256 2.515 2.609  
            
Payment Caps higher than $2/00/cwt are not recommended as a result of analyses done in this paper.  
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Table 33 MPP-DL tier 2 premium rates in $/cwt 
  Payment Cap  
  $1.00/cwt $1.50/cwt $2.00/cwt $2.50/cwt $3.00/cwt $3.50/cwt $4.00/cwt $4.50/cwt $5.00/cwt  
C
o
v
er
ag
e 
L
ev
el
 (
$
/c
w
t)
 
$4.00 0.016 0.020 0.023 0.024 0.026 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.027  
$4.50 0.024 0.030 0.034 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.041 0.041 0.042  
$5.00 0.036 0.046 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.063  
$5.50 0.076 0.099 0.078 0.084 0.088 0.091 0.093 0.094 0.095  
$6.00 0.093 0.120 0.139 0.176 0.187 0.194 0.200 0.204 0.207  
$6.50 0.132 0.170 0.197 0.216 0.229 0.238 0.244 0.249 0.252  
$7.00 0.183 0.238 0.277 0.303 0.322 0.335 0.344 0.350 0.355  
$7.50 0.249 0.326 0.381 0.420 0.447 0.465 0.478 0.487 0.494  
$8.00 0.294 0.385 0.514 0.569 0.608 0.635 0.653 0.666 0.675  
$8.50 0.384 0.510 0.600 0.664 0.706 0.735 0.753 0.764 0.772  
$9.00 0.526 0.710 0.773 0.864 0.928 0.970 0.998 1.017 1.028  
$9.50 0.602 0.861 1.044 1.080 1.171 1.234 1.277 1.305 1.323  
$10.00 0.686 0.964 1.230 1.414 1.422 1.513 1.576 1.619 1.647  
$10.50 0.726 1.076 1.354 1.577 1.668 1.946 1.885 1.948 1.991  
$11.00 0.712 1.017 1.445 1.767 1.816 2.228 2.364 2.285 2.348  
$11.50  0.777 1.117 1.421 1.691 2.241 2.234 2.664 2.618 2.708  
$12.00 0.833 1.207 1.546 1.851 2.120 2.472 2.672 2.934 3.060  
            
Payment Caps higher than $2/00/cwt are not recommended as a result of analyses done in this paper. 
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Table 34 Summary statistics of product types 
Size 
(oz) 
Container 
Type 
Lactose-
Free 
Fat 
Content 
Average 
($/gallon) 
Std. Dev 
($/gallon) 
Max 
($/gallon) 
Min 
($/gallon) 
32 Carton No Skim 6.77 1.45 13.16 3.96 
32 Carton No 1% 6.23 0.95 7.96 3.95 
32 Carton No 2% 6.53 1.29 11.93 3.99 
32 Carton No Whole 6.48 1.23 11.73 3.90 
32 Carton Yes Skim 9.50 1.12 11.96 4.76 
32 Carton Yes 1% 9.91 1.40 14.76 4.32 
32 Carton Yes 2% 9.43 1.03 17.89 5.16 
32 Plastic No Skim 6.64 1.54 13.32 3.27 
32 Plastic No 1% 6.73 1.51 12.84 3.55 
32 Plastic No 2% 6.74 1.25 9.88 3.32 
32 Plastic No Whole 6.83 1.12 9.53 3.48 
64 Carton No Skim 6.32 0.81 8.51 4.38 
64 Carton No 1% 5.94 0.99 8.33 3.66 
64 Carton No 2% 6.35 0.98 8.96 3.89 
64 Carton No Whole 6.91 0.98 9.16 3.99 
64 Carton Yes Skim 7.45 0.55 9.04 6.14 
64 Carton Yes 1% 6.94 1.04 10.58 1.79 
64 Carton Yes 2% 7.58 0.49 8.93 6.31 
64 Carton Yes Whole 7.51 0.56 9.06 6.05 
64 Plastic No Skim 4.34 0.75 6.44 2.27 
64 Plastic No 1% 5.24 1.13 8.26 2.30 
64 Plastic No 2% 4.57 0.75 6.22 1.93 
64 Plastic No Whole 4.36 0.70 6.07 1.96 
128 Carton No 1% 5.73 1.22 8.23 3.05 
128 Plastic No Skim 3.13 0.53 4.75 1.83 
128 Plastic No 1% 3.16 0.56 4.94 1.59 
128 Plastic No 2% 3.16 0.52 4.74 1.91 
128 Plastic No Whole 3.31 0.51 4.82 2.01 
32 Carton No Skim 6.77 1.45 13.16 3.96 
32 Carton No 1% 6.23 0.95 7.96 3.95 
32 Carton No 2% 6.53 1.29 11.93 3.99 
32 Carton No Whole 6.48 1.23 11.73 3.90 
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Table 35 Description of milk product attributes 
Product Attribute Description 
Size In fluid ounce. Permissible values are 32, 64 and 128. 
Container type Binary; 0 for carton, 1 for plastic 
Lactose-free label Is “lactose-free” label shown on package  
Fat content Permissible values are skim, 1%, 2%, whole 
Kosher label Is the milk marketed kosher 
Vitamin A Is vitamin A marketed on package 
Vitamin AP Is vitamin A Palmitate marketed on package 
Vitamin B6 Is vitamin B6 marketed on package 
Vitamin B12 Is vitamin B12 marketed on package 
Vitamin C Is vitamin C marketed on package 
Vitamin D Is vitamin D marketed on package 
Vitamin D3 Is vitamin D3 marketed on package 
Vitamin E Is vitamin E marketed on package 
 
113 
Table 36 Number of linear and nonlinear cointegrated price pairs in each MSA (TSP 
included) 
   Number of Breaks  Number of Thresholds   
MSA Series  0 1 2  0 1 2  Total 
New York 28  37% 81% 96%  59% 100% 100%  100% 
Log Angeles 28  71% 71% 82%  61% 93% 89%  93% 
Chicago 25  72% 72% 96%  48% 96% 100%  100% 
Dallas 26  40% 76% 96%  44% 96% 96%  96% 
Houston 25  58% 67% 83%  58% 88% 88%  92% 
Philadelphia 27  63% 78% 93%  7% 96% 93%  96% 
Miami 22  55% 82% 100%  55% 95% 95%  100% 
Atlanta 26  48% 68% 96%  56% 96% 92%  96% 
Boston 26  54% 88% 100%  46% 96% 100%  100% 
San Francisco 28  43% 64% 93%  21% 100% 96%  100% 
Phoenix 26  92% 92% 100%  54% 100% 96%  100% 
Riverside 28  79% 79% 89%  64% 96% 93%  96% 
Detroit 23  80% 88% 100%  76% 100% 100%  100% 
Seattle 22  71% 67% 86%  43% 95% 90%  95% 
Minneapolis-St Paul 27  77% 92% 96%  50% 100% 96%  100% 
Total 387  63% 78% 94%  49% 97% 95%  98% 
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Table 37 Critical values for threshold cointegration  𝑡𝑀𝑎𝑥 test with 𝑇 = 100 
No Break 1 Threshold  No Break 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 -1.61 -1.85 -2.35  0 -2.18 -2.41 -2.87 
1 -1.65 -1.90 -2.39  1 -2.24 -2.48 -2.95 
4 -1.66 -1.92 -2.44  4 -2.26 -2.52 -2.99 
         
1 Break 1 Threshold  1 Break 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 -2.26 -2.54 -3.04  0 -2.61 -2.87 -3.31 
1 -2.04 -2.33 -2.85  1 -2.29 -2.55 -3.04 
4 -2.28 -2.63 -3.22  4 -2.57 -2.86 -3.40 
         
2 Breaks 1 Threshold  2 Breaks 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 -3.20 -3.48 -3.98  0 -3.38 -3.63 -4.12 
1 -3.01 -3.25 -3.76  1 -3.19 -3.43 -3.90 
4 -3.56 -3.89 -4.58  4 -3.71 -4.01 -4.59 
Critical values for the case of no break and 1 threshold are from Enders and 
Siklos (2001). Other numbers are from own calculation.  
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Table 38 Critical values for threshold cointegration  𝜙 test with 𝑇 = 100 
No Break 1 Threshold  No Break 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 5.95 6.95 9.27  0 5.70 6.59 8.46 
1 6.02 7.08 9.51  1 5.77 6.65 8.51 
4 6.35 7.41 9.88  4 5.64 6.50 8.48 
         
1 Break 1 Threshold  1 Break 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 12.87 14.49 18.04  0 9.88 11.19 14.00 
1 10.84 12.23 15.52  1 8.32 9.44 11.87 
4 10.55 11.91 14.94  4 8.28 9.32 11.58 
         
2 Breaks 1 Threshold  2 Breaks 2 Thresholds 
Lags 90% 95% 99%  Lags 90% 95% 99% 
0 19.13 21.03 25.06  0 14.12 15.70 18.63 
1 15.39 16.87 19.83  1 11.40 12.41 14.68 
4 15.84 17.47 20.88  4 11.88 13.05 15.79 
Critical values for the case of no break and 1 threshold are from Enders and 
Siklos (2001). Other numbers are from own calculation. 
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Table 39 Symmetric transmission test results with TSP included 
     
Region CCEMG  
Lower 
Regime 
(𝜃𝑡
𝐿) 
CCEMG  
Upper Regime 
(𝜃𝑡
𝑈) 
% of Series 
that Reject 
Individual 
Symmetry Test 
Null: Eq (11) 
Panel 
Symmetry Test 
(?̅?𝑈) 
Null: Eq (12) 
     
New York -0.720 *** 
(0.275) 
-0.659  
(0.646) 
59% -0.061  
(0.232) 
Log Angeles -0.632 ** 
(0.271) 
-0.331 *** 
(0.114) 
68% 0.300  
(0.424) 
Chicago -0.568 *** 
(0.168) 
-0.266 ** 
(0.109) 
76% -0.301 ** 
(0.151) 
Dallas -0.407 *** 
(0.137) 
-0.231 ** 
(0.110) 
84% -0.176 ** 
(0.087) 
Houston -0.552 * 
(0.312) 
-0.296 * 
(0.155) 
71% 0.256 * 
(0.132) 
Philadelphia -0.235 *** 
(0.084) 
-0.191 * 
(0.103) 
93% 0.043 * 
(0.024) 
Miami -0.460 *** 
(0.084) 
-0.315 * 
(0.174) 
91% 0.145 * 
(0.076) 
Atlanta -0.633 *** 
(0.107) 
-0.361 ** 
(0.148) 
88% -0.273 ** 
(0.124) 
Boston -0.440 * 
(0.267) 
-0.217  
(0.352) 
73% -0.223  
(0.550) 
San Francisco -0.364 *** 
(0.124) 
-0.134 * 
(0.071) 
93% 0.230 * 
(0.120) 
Phoenix -1.095 *** 
(0.298) 
-0.161 * 
(0.088) 
88% -0.934 * 
(0.518) 
Riverside -0.100 * 
(0.056) 
-0.667 * 
(0.400) 
86% 0.567 ** 
(0.283) 
Detroit -0.997 *** 
(0.235) 
-0.491 ** 
(0.193) 
76% -0.506 ** 
(0.240) 
Seattle -0.530 * 
(0.293) 
-0.250  
(0.226) 
43% -0.280  
(0.551) 
Minneapolis-St 
Paul 
-0.538 ** 
(0.218) 
-0.361 *** 
(0.090) 
96% 0.003 *** 
(0.001) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 40 Detailed number of linear and nonlinear cointegrated price pairs in each MSA with TSP excluded 
 No Breakpoint  1 Breakpoint  2 Breakpoints   
Threshold 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  Series 
New York 4% 32% 39%  4% 61% 50%  61% 79% 89%  28 
Log Angeles 4% 39% 39%  4% 68% 79%  57% 86% 93%  28 
Chicago 16% 64% 52%  0% 88% 76%  40% 92% 96%  25 
Dallas 8% 31% 46%  12% 77% 65%  42% 88% 92%  26 
Houston 12% 36% 44%  4% 52% 60%  44% 76% 72%  25 
Philadelphia 4% 33% 19%  0% 67% 52%  11% 85% 93%  27 
Miami 0% 23% 23%  0% 41% 64%  50% 82% 95%  22 
Atlanta 12% 46% 46%  4% 46% 65%  46% 92% 92%  26 
Boston 15% 42% 38%  4% 69% 81%  54% 92% 96%  26 
San Francisco 14% 21% 21%  0% 50% 54%  36% 79% 79%  28 
Phoenix 23% 81% 69%  19% 73% 69%  46% 92% 88%  26 
Riverside 11% 36% 50%  4% 64% 57%  54% 93% 86%  28 
Detroit 17% 52% 61%  22% 83% 91%  61% 100% 100%  23 
Seattle 14% 64% 50%  9% 41% 64%  27% 86% 86%  22 
Minneapolis-St Paul 0% 37% 30%  7% 89% 81%  37% 85% 93%  27 
Total 10% 42% 42%  6% 65% 67%  44% 87% 90%  387 
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Table 41 Detailed number of linear and nonlinear cointegrated price pairs in each MSA with TSP included 
 No Breakpoint  1 Breakpoint  2 Breakpoints   
Threshold 0 1 2  0 1 2  0 1 2  Series 
New York 19% 37% 30%  0% 74% 70%  52% 85% 96%  28 
Log Angeles 29% 54% 57%  0% 57% 64%  46% 82% 82%  28 
Chicago 20% 60% 56%  4% 68% 60%  28% 92% 96%  25 
Dallas 12% 36% 32%  0% 72% 64%  32% 96% 96%  26 
Houston 25% 50% 46%  4% 58% 54%  42% 79% 75%  25 
Philadelphia 4% 59% 52%  0% 48% 70%  4% 89% 81%  27 
Miami 0% 45% 32%  5% 68% 77%  55% 95% 95%  22 
Atlanta 8% 44% 44%  8% 56% 68%  52% 96% 92%  26 
Boston 27% 50% 42%  4% 77% 77%  35% 88% 100%  26 
San Francisco 7% 25% 43%  0% 57% 54%  18% 89% 79%  28 
Phoenix 15% 85% 88%  15% 88% 73%  42% 100% 92%  26 
Riverside 29% 57% 61%  0% 61% 75%  50% 86% 89%  28 
Detroit 4% 68% 72%  36% 84% 80%  76% 100% 100%  23 
Seattle 33% 62% 67%  24% 52% 48%  24% 81% 76%  22 
Minneapolis-St Paul 0% 54% 69%  8% 73% 88%  50% 96% 92%  27 
Total 15% 52% 53%  7% 66% 68%  40% 90% 90%  387 
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Figure 14 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:7.5, CP:90%) 
 
Figure 15 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:7.5 CP:90%) 
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Figure 16 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 17 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 18 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 19 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 20 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 21 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 22 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 23 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 24 Upper Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 25 Lower Midwest grower with 4 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 26 Upper Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 27 Lower Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 28 Upper Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 29 Lower Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
18.60 18.80 19.00 19.20 19.40 19.60 19.80 20.00 20.20
Revenue Threshold
HR w/o MPP HR w/ MPP % Change in HR
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
18.20 18.40 18.60 18.80 19.00 19.20 19.40 19.60
Revenue Threshold
HR w/o MPP HR w/ MPP % Change in HR
127 
Figure 30 Upper Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 31 Lower Midwest grower with 4 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 32 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.5, CP:90%) 
 
Figure 33 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
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Figure 34 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 35 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 36 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 37 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 38 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 39 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 40 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 41 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 42 Upper Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 43 Lower Midwest grower with 6 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 44 Upper Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 45 Lower Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 46 Upper Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 47 Lower Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 48 Upper Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 49 Lower Midwest grower with 6 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 50 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.0, CP:90%) 
 
Figure 51 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 52 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 53 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2008 for 2009 
(CL:6.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 54 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 55 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2009 for 2009 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 56 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 57 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Apr, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:8.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 58 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 59 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Oct, 2011 for 2012 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
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Figure 60 Upper Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:6.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 61 Lower Midwest grower with 60 mm PH signing up in Jan, 2012 for 2012 
(CL:6.0 CP:90%) 
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Figure 62 Upper Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 63 Lower Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Apr, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
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Figure 64 Upper Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 65 Lower Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Oct, 2012 for 2013 
(CL:6.5 CP:90%) 
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Figure 66 Upper Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:4.0 CP:90%) 
 
Figure 67 Lower Midwest grower with 60 million PH signing up in Jan, 2013 for 2013 
(CL:4.0 CP:90%) 
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